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# INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACY: THE MYTH AND REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

Thomas G. Weiss\*

**R**EACTIONS in developed countries to the United Nations system and the officials who staff it are indifferent at best and outright hostile at worst. Ironically, these same institutions and personnel are increasingly involved in the discussion on numerous issues of importance for the citizens of these countries—hostages in Iran, international economic relations, and the status of refugees in South East Asia are recent examples. This article examines the theory of the international civil service and the reality of the supra-national staff who are charged with the day-to-day responsibility for international co-operation.

Although international organisations have traditionally been of marginal interest to scholars and national decision-makers not directly connected with the study or operation of international institutions, the situation has significantly changed during the last two decades. Decolonisation led to the rapid expansion of United Nations membership in the 1960s; and raw materials prices and shortages during the 1970s helped developing countries to assert their positions as active members of the international system in which they emphasised the work of the United Nations more than did established, economically developed states. The recognition of new problems and the rush to erect new rhetorical or institutional responses have so far monopolised analytical attention whilst the administrative aspects of these international bureaucracies have tended to be overlooked.<sup>1</sup>

\* This article updates earlier views of the same author in the light of his experience as an international civil servant since 1975. It should be noted that the opinions set forth are his sole responsibility and not those of the international secretariat for which he works.

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1. There have, of course, been historical investigations and internal studies that have criticised the performance of international administration. Well known examples of historical scholarship are: Robert S. Jordan, ed., *International Administration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Georges Langrod, *The International Civil Service* (New York: Oceana, 1963); Alexander Loveday, *Reflection on International Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956); Egon Ranshofen-Wetheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945); and Jean Siotis, *Essai sur le Secrétariat International* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963). The most publicised example of an internal self-criticism is Robert G. A. Jackson, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*, 2 Vols, DP/5 (Geneva: United Nations, 1969). Other examples are the numerous reports of the Joint Inspection

The working hypothesis here is that the unwieldy administrative structures of functional secretariats are counterproductive to the idealistic goals that they have been created to pursue. International institutions fail to be effective not only because of a shortage of resources or insurmountable political problems, but also because of the processes by which resources are allocated. The reasons for this failure become clearer, however, when we examine the nature of the international civil service, and its impact on the day-to-day operations of international organisations. The investigation which follows will therefore illustrate the theory and practice underlying international administration; provide some indications of its ability to serve humanity; suggest reasons for its historically poor performance; and offer some proposals for improvement.

The subject matter is particularly pertinent in that the new Secretary-General has specified that the restoration of staff integrity and morale is to be a priority during his tenure.

### The conventional paradigm<sup>2</sup> of the international civil service

The principles underlying the international civil service are multinational composition and responsibility. These principles evolved in the practice and declarations of the League of Nations and have been reaffirmed in those of the United Nations. Each international official is expected to approach decision-making objectively, taking into account the opinions of all nations and the impact of any decision upon the globe as a whole. Such persons cannot be content with particularistic points of view, nor can they favour more narrowly defined national interests. Further, officials are subordinate only to administrative superiors. Most commentators see no unusual political or bureaucratic behavioural problems arising in the international administration. Ignorance of structural conflicts—even of the most basic problems arising from differences among individual personalities—is the norm.<sup>3</sup>

Unit, the most illustrative being: Maurice Bertrand, *Personnel Questions: Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations*, A/8454 Part I and II, Oct. 5, 1971, and *Report on Medium-Term Planning in the United Nations System, document JIU/REP/74/1*. See also: Martin F. Hill, *Towards Greater Order, Coherence and Co-ordination in the United Nations System*, (New York: UNITAR Research Report No. 20, 1974), originally E/5491.

There have been far too few critical case studies of the behaviour of international secretariats and inadequate theoretical efforts to determine the relevance of the present structures of international bureaucracy. The author hopes to have helped to fill this gap: Thomas George Weiss, *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1975). See also Theodor Meron, *The United Nations Secretariat* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1977); Seymour Maxwell Finger and John F. Mugno, 'The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat', *Orbis*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 117-45; and Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the United Nations Secretariat* (Brighton: Institute for the Study of International Organization, 1970). For an application of this type of analysis to one Secretariat, see: Robert L. Rothstein, *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 169-216.

2. Although the precision of this term in the natural sciences is not directly applicable to the social sciences, the concept of the international civil service is so prevalent within the theory and practice of international organisation that one is justified in attaching to it the status of 'paradigm'. The classic formulation of the theory of paradigmatic processes in the natural sciences was stated by Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

3. See a definitive statement by Dag Hammarskjöld: 'The International Civil Service in Law and in Fact', lecture of May 30, 1961 at University of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961).

The concept of an objective and detached international administration is of recent vintage. The earliest examples date from the administrative experience of the nineteenth century when the Industrial Revolution opened the way for many forms of interstate co-operation. Changes in technology and communications linked European economies to overseas markets and resources. As economies expanded and trade developed, public international unions began to emerge.<sup>4</sup> These international entities exemplified a structural innovation in the international system that has become more generalised in the twentieth century. Permanent staffs were sometimes created to carry out research and update the correspondence necessary for effective co-ordination. Tasks were increasingly performed by non-diplomats—persons knowledgeable in a given area, or who represented identifiable interests or who were technicians. New institutional mechanisms for co-operation were created that represented experiments with new forms of bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup>

These nineteenth century developments occurred in international organisations that did not seek universal participation; what is known today as the international civil service originated with the League of Nations. The origins of the concept of an international civil service can be traced to the foresight of the first Secretary-General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond. His conception differed from that of the other British citizen first offered his post, and of most other members of the Paris Peace Conference who were intent on institutionalising national interests along the lines of the recently successful interallied war effort—organised administratively on the basis of national loyalties (a system not dissimilar from that of the European Economic Commission).<sup>6</sup> The League's Covenant is silent on the issue of the loyalty of officials for its signatories envisioned a continuation of co-operative efforts by officials who would be taken directly from national diplomatic ranks to fill League vacancies. Drummond recognised, however, the political dangers of a nationalistic organisational framework for an organisation devoted to international welfare and tried to prevent the establishment of permanent delegations to the League in order to avoid governmental pressures on Geneva's officialdom.<sup>7</sup>

4. See the introductory sections of Josef L. Kunz, 'Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 41, No. 4 Oct. 1947, pp. 828-62.

5. The existence of some private voluntary associations whose purposes included aiding war victims, promoting scientific and religious tolerance, upgrading worker conditions, and developing a universal language should not be overlooked. See: Georges P. Speeckaert, 'International Non-Governmental Cooperation in the Future', *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, Vol. 21, No. 5, May-June 1965, especially pp. 115-16. A more detailed account of this development can be found in Paul Reinsch, *Public International Unions: Their Work and Organisations: A Study in International Administrative Law* (Boston: Ginn, 1911). Some authors look upon the period of 1865 to 1914 (33 intergovernmental and 182 nongovernmental organisations were created during this period) as the great period of the development of international co-operation that was arrested by the holocaust of 1914. See: F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe 1815-1914* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1963).

6. For a longer discussion, see: Robert S. Jordan, 'The Influence of the British Secretariat Tradition on the Formation of the League of Nations', pp. 27-50; and Robert Rhodes James, 'The Evolving Concept of the International Civil Service', in Jordan, ed., *International Administration, op. cit.*, pp. 51-73. For an early study of the British, Canadian, French, and German services, see L. D. White, C. H. Bland, W. R. Sharp, and F. M. Marx, *Civil Service Abroad* (New York: McGraw, 1935).

7. See, Francis P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952),

Drummond's principles of international responsibility were subsequently codified and reaffirmed by three League committees and published in the Balfour, Nobelmaire, and Committee of Thirteen Reports.<sup>8</sup> These reports basically echoed Drummond's concept of international loyalty and introduced the practice of distributing League posts to various nations as a possible means to secure internationalism in organisational practice. They also formulated salary and promotional guidelines to ensure the recruitment of high calibre officials. Two principles eventually predominated: a diverse staff selected from a wide geographical distribution, and job security through a system of permanent contracts. Although the value of the theory of the international civil service remained intact, the League's failure was, in part at least, due to the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests by certain staff members (especially Italian and German) despite the increasingly international character of its expanding staff. Towards the end of the Second World War, speculation arose as the eventual shape of a proper international apparatus to replace the League after cessation of conflict. In the United States the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored conferences on the experience of Geneva-based international officials.<sup>9</sup> Interest in the experiment in international administration also revived elsewhere; the most important work was performed in London under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Public Administration.<sup>10</sup>

The combined evaluations of experiences by former officials of the League of Nations and the International Labour Office indicated that international administration was practicable and would be indispensable for the success of future international institutions. On the eve of the Preparatory Conference of what was to become the United Nations, a general sentiment prevailed among

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Vol. 1, pp. 15-39 and 75-80. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-52; and Siotis, *Essai*, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84.

8. Staff of the Secretariat, Report presented by the British Representative, Mr. A. J. Balfour, *Office Journal*, June 1920, pp. 136-39 (hereafter 'Balfour Report'); 'Organisation of the Secretariat and of the International Labor Office': Report submitted by Committee No. 4 on the Conclusions and the Proposals of the Committee of Experts Appointed in Accordance with the Resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its meeting on Dec. 17, 1920, *Actes de la Deuxième Assemblée Séances Plénières* (1921), pp. 595-626, and also C.424.M.305.1921.X and A.140(a).1921 (hereafter 'Nobelmaire Report' after its rapporteur); 'Committee of Enquiry on the Organization of the Secretariat, the International Labor Office and the Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Report of the Committee', Geneva, 1930, A.16.1930 (hereafter 'Committee of 13').

9. See especially the *Proceedings of Conference on Experience in International Administration*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, Jan. 30, 1943, and *Proceedings of Exploratory Conference on the League of Nations Secretariat*, New York, Aug. 21-22, 1943 (hereafter *Proceedings January 1943* and *Proceedings August 1943*, respectively). Also, the Carnegie Endowment sponsored the research and publication of Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*.

10. The most important publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs are: 'The International Secretariat of the Future: Lessons from Experience by a Group of Former Officials of the League of Nations' (London: RIIA, 1944, hereafter 'London Report'); Chester Purves, 'The International Administration of an International Secretariat' (London: RIIA, 1945); and J. V. Wilson, 'Problems of an International Secretariat' *International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Oct. 1944, pp. 542-54. The Institute of Public Administration was responsible for an important document concerning the internal mechanics of international administration in a series of articles edited by Arthur Salter, *International Administration* (London: Research Studies of the Institute of Public Administration, 1945).

former officials: the success or failure of a new attempt at world government would depend in part upon the competence of the newly assembled staff.

The end of the second global conflict in thirty years brought about the construction of a system of international organisation staffed by international officials on a scale historically unprecedented. Evaluations of the performance of the international civil service have continued to be generally laudatory. At San Francisco the concept of an independent international administration was considered sufficiently important to be specified in article 100 of the Charter—which recognised explicitly that supranational loyalty, impartiality, and independence for administrative officials was critical for the success of the new international organisation. Moreover, article 104 guaranteed the extraterritorial freedom necessary for an international administration; and in 1947 the General Assembly recommended that all member states adopt national legislation that would permit international officials complete autonomy in a host country.<sup>11</sup> The United Nations has also codified all of the principles of the international civil service in the Staff Regulations.<sup>12</sup> Article 1.9—the oath of office by which international officials commit themselves to uphold the trust placed in them by the world community—is of particular note:

I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Organization.

Perhaps no other legal decision is more important to the study of international administration than that of the International Court of Justice in 1949 concerning the reparations to the United Nations for the assassination of one of its staff members.<sup>13</sup> Count Bernadotte was on a United Nations mission of mediation when he was killed in Palestine. In awarding direct damages, the Court unanimously recognised that international institutions have some

11. 'Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations', Document A/64, July 1, 1946, and 'Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; ST/LEG/3 of 1953. For a discussion of the general subject, see: John Kerry King, *The Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of International Organizations* (Denmark: Strandberg, Odense, 1949); and *International Administrative Jurisdiction* (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1952).

12. See: ST/SGB/Staff Regulations/Rev.12, 1979. Reference is made to clauses of the United Nations regulations, but the conclusions are equally valid for the other United Nations organisations.

13. Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949 on 'Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations', *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1949, p. 179. For a further discussion of the general issue, see, Carol McCormic Crosswell, *Protection of International Personnel Abroad* (New York: Oceana, 1952). Precedents establishing the validity of a partial legal personality for international organisations necessary to preserve the autonomy of these institutions have been reaffirmed in two other cases to come before the Court; but in neither case is the language as clear as it is in the 'Reparations' case. The interested reader is referred to two advisory opinions: July 13, 1954, 'Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal', *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1954, pp. 47-97; and Oct. 23, 1956, 'Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization Upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO', *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1956, pp. 76-168.

measure of legal personality, based principally upon the existence of the universally accepted ideal of the international civil service. The international legal principle of 'diplomatic protection'—according to which the claims of an individual are normally presented only by his or her native state in an international tribunal—was applied to an international organisation in order to represent the claims of its staff members.

### The reality of international administration

Studies of international administration tend to lump together national and international bureaucratic analyses, thereby missing what are the truly distinctive problems that hinder more effective action by international organisations. It is to five important and distinctive features that this article now turns.

*Geographical distribution and international loyalty.* Article 101.3 of the United Nations Charter makes the geographical quota an elementary principle of the organisation. Although political and demographic weighting systems were also proposed, the geographical formula was adopted with the ratio of member states' financial contributions a 'rule of thumb' in determining an approximate number of posts.<sup>14</sup> The geographical quota in the Charter demonstrates the gradual acceptance of an organising principle for an international bureaucracy demanding the inclusion of a required number of national perspectives.

The Covenant did not mention the geographical balance of the League's Secretariat. The original British proposal of 1919 recommended that the Chancellor (later called the Secretary-General), after consultation with governments, should appoint ten permanent assistant secretaries on the basis of fixed geographical ratio.<sup>15</sup> After the rejection of this proposal, the subject of geographical representation received little attention. The assumption at Versailles seemed to be that whatever variety resulted would arise from the division of posts among the great powers; and of these the mixture was to be primarily British and French. Smaller nations did propose an amendment to article 6.3 of the Covenant, which read: 'So far as possible, the Secretaries and

14. The mathematical precision of the geographical quota is not always admitted, but is important. Each post for which the formula applies is assigned a certain number of points. An official at the P.1 level = 1 point and P.2 = 2 points, while a principal director = 12 points. If one multiplies the number of posts by their value, a total results that is in turn multiplied by the percentage of the budgetary contributions of a state to get the quota of assigned posts. The exception to this rule are that the number of posts can vary  $\pm 25$  per cent from the norm; no state is too small to have at least 3 officials; and the United States is not allowed to fulfil all of the posts that its relatively large contribution would otherwise merit. Such calculations are not publicised, but made in personnel offices; and public statements tend to emphasise the objectivity of the system. See especially: International Civil Service Advisory Board, 'Report on Recruitment Methods and Standards of 1950', COORD/Civil Service/2, p. iv.

15. David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris: With Documents* (New York, printed for the author by Appeal Printing, 1924), Vol. IV, doct 226, p. 41. This proposal suggested the selection of one secretary from each state of the Council, two from European states not in the Council, one from Latin America, two from all other states.

the personnel shall belong to different nationalities'.<sup>16</sup> Although this amendment received little attention because of more pressing issues, the desire to have all national interests represented within the international administration was clearly a concern of small and large powers alike. Furthermore, the three key personnel documents of the League all proposed variations of the geographical quota.<sup>17</sup> Eventually article 10 of the League's Staff Regulations was formulated: 'Recruitment in the First Division shall be effected with special regard to the importance of securing the collaboration on its staff of nationals of various Members of the League.'

The preparatory commission of the United Nations found the principle of integrity and geographical quotas not only reconcilable but also desirable.<sup>18</sup> The policy of the Organisation has become increasingly rigid with posts being distributed niggardly among member states in the extended United Nations family. Newly independent states whose demands for recognition and equality necessarily require representation in the international civil service actually led as early as the 23rd Session of the General Assembly to outline the desired percentage representation for various regions.<sup>19</sup>

The justification of geographical quotas has been based on two arguments. First, quotas are thought to be politically necessary. The staffs of international institutions must reflect universal membership, one of the United Nations goals. Because developing countries have traditionally been under-represented in quotas and now comprise about two-thirds of the organisational membership, it is politically impossible to avoid the issue of staff distribution.

Second, an international administration and its decision-making should profit from the advantages of a heterogeneous staff. The 'contacts' from former careers in government certainly provide channels for communication that would not exist otherwise. While caucusing and drafting by secretariats is facilitated and negotiations perhaps accelerated,<sup>20</sup> the historical development of the international civil service could more usefully be interpreted as having provided a rationalisation for institutionalising national interests in the guise of a political dialogue within the administrative staffs of international institutions.

A person who is recruited, hired, and promoted according to his or her national origins would normally hesitate to ignore them. The geographical quota tends to ensure that national interests continue to be acceptable rationale for policies, both inside and outside international organisations. According to the quota system, positions are not always filled on the basis of qualifications but rather on nominations or pressure from governments; a certain number of officials must represent the different nations involved in bureaucratic

16. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, doct 576, p. 89.

17. 'Balfour Report', p. 137; 'Nobelmaire Report', 1921, pp. 600-603; and 'Report of the Committee of 13', 1930, pp. 10-11.

18. Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, 'Report to the General Assembly', 1945, PC/20, p. 85.

19. Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly A/7334, Order No. 81.

20. This approach has been analysed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Oct. 1974, pp. 39-62.



functions. This policy may have initially been suggested—and subsequently defended by the developing nations—to prevent international organisations from becoming the monopoly of nationals from large, developed countries. Ironically, the solidification of national loyalties within international bureaucracies has proved a major obstacle to the expressed redistributive goals of international organisation. Supranational co-operation is now inhibited not only by governmental controls over budgets and security policies, but also by the representational composition of the international administrative apparatus.<sup>21</sup>

*National governmental control: Soviet and United States techniques.* During the early days of the League of Nations its policies with regard to personnel were not rigorously enforced. The predominance of French and British in the staff was an obvious violation of the theoretical commitment to heterogeneity.<sup>22</sup> Further, while staff regulations had explicitly forbidden public political pronouncements or the holding of political offices by international officials, Albert Thomas continued as a member of the French Chamber of Deputies during part of his tenure as Director-General of the International Labour Office.

During the 1930s political crises and public criticism forced changes. Representation on the staff was widened and the official Staff Regulations were amended to prohibit overtly political activity, mainly as an antidote to the blatant manipulation of international officials with Italian and German nationalities. This experience foreshadowed the more general problems of the United Nations in reconciling international loyalty and international efficiency with the desire of member states to control their nationals in international service. An Italian law of June 16, 1927, required that all Italian nationals desiring to enter the service of another nation or a public international agency had to obtain the permission of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>23</sup> The Italian development reached a climax when Marquis Paulucci di Calboni Barone became the Italian Under Secretary-General, moving directly from his position as Mussolini's *chef de cabinet*. He promptly organised all Italian officials into a cell, set himself up as chief, and wore a fascist lapel pin at headquarters.<sup>24</sup>

The present situation of many international officials is also similar to that of German nationals who were international officials during the late 1920s.

21. The pressure applied on international secretariats to place their own nationals in international staff positions was formerly only a concern of diplomatic missions for very senior posts, which were the positions where it was assumed that national interests could best be defended. However, governments increasingly exert significant pressures for all professional posts no matter how junior. In fact, thirteen states are now sponsors of the 'associate expert programme' in which posts at the lowest professional level are financed with the stipulation that they be filled by a national of the country financing the post.

22. For the statistics on the exact numerical distribution, see: Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-64.

23. For the text of this law and a discussion of its significance see: Manley O. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 331.

24. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 245, 249-51, and 408.

The League, which Germany joined in 1926, was looked upon as the institutionalisation of the German defeat through the Treaty of Versailles. As all aspects of this settlement were increasingly under attack, German nationals appointed to the secretariat began to view organisational policy questions more nationalistically than many fellow officials. German international officials were an integral part of the German national civil service, and did not share the internationalist perspective that grew out of the Paris negotiations. Dissension within administrative ranks elicited an oath of office, itself a recognition that the paradigm of the international civil service was in part a product of wishful thinking.<sup>25</sup>

The potential extent of governmental control and influence on administrative loyalty, and hence the effectiveness of international organisations, can be seen in the contemporary approaches of the two major contributors to the United Nations budgets. The policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, which have the most nationals employed in international secretariats, tend to legitimise similar behaviour by other nations.<sup>26</sup>

It is widely recognised that Soviet international civil servants are dependent upon their government not only for initial appointments but also for subsequent promotions. Many are expected to convey information to their government, and such activities have led to numerous expulsions from the United Nations' administrative cities. They frequently caucus with other Russians in official government settings. One indication of the extent of control is that the Soviet Union has never allowed one of its citizens to receive a permanent appointment; all Soviet officials return to national posts immediately after their fixed-term sojourns in international administration. Contracts (duration, level, etc.) are not negotiated with the individual, but with his or her government.

The Soviet Union has never supported the ideal of an international civil service which many states have supported, at least rhetorically. The Soviet Union regards international secretariats as vehicles that provide services to nation states when they meet for discussions; and thus the use of pressure in questions of personnel is a perfectly legitimate undertaking. For the individual Russians involved, career advancement at home depends on the evaluation of their performance as international officials, which explains why they must keep an eye constantly on the reactions of their own government.

25. For a discussion, see Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 316-27, and Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-255.

26. The studies of the politics of influence within administrations have gradually been recognised as contributing to the mediocre impact of the United Nations system; see, S. M. Finger and John Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat*, (New York: Ralph Bunch Institute, 1974), republished also in *Orbis*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 117-45. For the lack of competence in international officials, see, Maurice Bertrand, *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit of Personnel Problems in the United Nations*, Oct. 5, 1971, A/8454; Richard Gardner, ed., *The Future of the United Nations Secretariat* (Rensselaerville: NY: Institute on Man and Science, 1972); Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the United Nations Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, and *Report of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System* (New York: United Nations, 1972), A/8728.

Whilst the Soviet Union's control over its nationals who are international officials clearly inhibits independent action by an international administration, the policies of the United States government toward its nationals in service to the world community are usually assumed to have quite a different impact. While subtler, American policies have much the same overall effect and have provided a model of interference that other states have found more appropriate than the Soviet variety.<sup>27</sup>

It should be recalled that the United States position toward the international civil service has always been ambivalent. Possible membership of the United States in the League had originally raised domestic concerns about the potential incompatibility between the pledge of international loyalty by an international official and the allegiance to the Constitution demanded of United States citizens. In the aftermath of Italian and German nationalism, an oath of office for all officials was instituted in 1932. The Hearst newspapers reacted with a series of syndicated articles that questioned whether an oath pledging international loyalty and fidelity was indeed compatible with citizenship. A complete study was undertaken by the State Department which eventually decided that this oath was not a pledge of allegiance, but simply a declaration of loyalty and therefore compatible with the dictates of citizenship. Washington had given thought to the manner of recruiting officials as to the other details for the preliminary sessions at Dumbarton Oaks.<sup>28</sup> In October 1944, however, American participants decided not to complicate the already complex agenda with a proposed overhaul of the international civil service and supported instead a straightforward continuation of the League's practices.

That discussions of bureaucratic organisation and the management of the new organisation were not begun immediately in the first sessions of the United Nations should not be construed to mean that articles 100-101 of the Charter reflect the position of the United States government. The efforts to manipulate Trygve Lie's administration should be seen in light of the furor over the League's oath of office and as a natural continuation of America's concern to control the content of the international administration. During the McCarthy period, the attack on the United Nations itself by the forces of the Wisconsin senator effectively demonstrated Washington's belief that international civil servants with United States passports should react as foreign service officers would in a similar situation. They should be counted on to defend the national interests of the United States with unquestioning loyalty.

27. In fact, the United States example may be even more relevant. International staffs are generally composed of 50 per cent nationals of Western nations and only 8-15 per cent from Socialist bloc. As two observers have written: 'Whether we consider the national origins of individuals or participating states, the rich Western countries with competitive politics are the predominant influence in all organizations. Their influence has remained remarkably stable, declining only marginally with the accession to membership of many new nations.' Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, 'The Anatomy of Influence', in Cox and Jacobson, eds, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 243.

28. In many ways, the United States government study, supervised by Cordell Hull, was the most elaborate and detailed one of international organisation ever undertaken by a government. For details, see: *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, Dept. of State Publication 3580 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949).

The most significant indication of organisational weakness was the willingness of the United Nations to accept and implement Executive Order of the President 10422, of January 9, 1953, 'Prescribing procedures for making available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations certain information concerning United States citizens employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations.'<sup>29</sup> An investigation is required of a prospective international civil servant by the United States Civil Service Commission with reference to the records of the FBI, the military, or 'any other appropriate source'. If information of activities unacceptable to the American government is found, it must be transmitted to the Secretary-General who is expected to use it responsibly—that is, not to hire, or alternatively to dismiss the official in question. The results of this process are not always what the American government might wish, as the work and motivations of men such as Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier indicate. However, the aberrant process of security clearances for American applicants is designed to provide internal bureaucratic support in the person of United States international officials who argue for American interests within the decision-making process.

This argument is even stronger for American civil servants who are seconded to international agencies. Executive Order 11552 of August 24, 1970 authorises the Secretary of State to lend State Department officials to international organisations, and recommends that upon return to national service the experience as an international civil servant be considered in determining subsequent grades and positions. Further, if any loss in salary is entailed by taking an international post, a compensatory formula ensures reimbursement upon return to the national civil service. How such officials differ in attitude or motivation from their Soviet counterparts is difficult to understand. Other nations inevitably attempt to copy the United States and the Soviet Union—through widespread use of clearances by member governments; and personnel policies which reinforce the primacy of national interest in international decision-making. The acceptability of such practices is almost unquestioned and certainly has a negative impact on organisational integrity. The Soviet and American examples sanction the legitimacy of national

29. Reprinted as Annex V of *Report*, A/2364, pp. 35–36. The United States government should abolish this 'loyalty check' on the grounds of cost-cutting and inefficiency alone. It is not clear what the benefits are, because few individuals are rejected for failure to receive the clearance. However, there are enormous administrative and financial costs, and the clearance may actually hurt the United States' overall goal in securing employment for Americans. United Nations recruitment officials oftentimes prefer a candidate of another nationality because the clearance process can add months to the time necessary for recruitment. Further, the clearance provides an obvious example of interference for other nations seeking to justify their own interference in the United Nations personal policies. As two observers have noted: 'Philosophically, in using its influence to effect individual appointments, the U.S. has both contributed to the legitimisation of such tactics and comprised its own belief in an objective international civil service, consequently lending legitimacy to the Soviet conception of the Secretariat as an intergovernmental organ staffed by partisans'. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing*, *op. cit.*, p. 41. For a discussion of the limited role played by the Secretary-General in standing up to such pressures, see, Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), especially chapters 2 and 3.

interests and the acceptability of influencing organisational decision-making through national representatives in an international administration.

*The external political climate and national budgetary control.* The allocation of public funds for administrative programming in international organisations is one of the basic determinants in their behaviour. All too frequently observers speak of international administrative action as if it occurred in a political vacuum: 'It is in the budget and finance areas, more than anywhere else, that the concept of state sovereignty has clashed head on with the principle of collective responsibility for an effective organization.'<sup>30</sup> The general political climate in conjunction with national power-of-the-purse in budgetary allocations has a dramatic effect upon the nature of bureaucratic activities. The financial leverage of individual states threatens organisational autonomy and undermines the theoretical conception of the international civil service.

The ability of a particular member state to manipulate international decision-making was illustrated both by the United States Congress' disregard for a ratified international treaty when it refused to contribute its obligatory share to the International Labour Office, and by its threats to UNESCO following political disagreements over Israel. The 1980 problems surrounding Arab contributions to the World Bank and IMF, resulting from the failure to seat the PLO, provide recent examples of a similar phenomenon.

The crisis over funding peacekeeping operations in the Congo resulted in the principle of the voluntary contributions that continues to provoke financial disorder. The reinforcement of the trend toward voluntary rather than assessed contributions has politicised an area of administrative activity previously less vulnerable to ideological confrontation. Voluntary contributions have reduced the role of the majority of member states in those decisions that affect the quality and volume of co-operative projects. An element of uncertainty as well as a veto over various types of programming have been introduced with voluntary contributions. This trend (65 per cent of United Nations system budgets at the present time) is favoured not only by the United States, but by other important contributing member states as well. The Socialist bloc has always demanded limitations on the budgetary autonomy of international institutions. The conventional wisdom is thus becoming that only basic administrative expenses should be included in regular budgets and that expenditures on programmes should not be the subject of binding decisions. Nations are not obliged to pay for operations not in their interest.

Thus, even if there were an international civil service committed to global perspectives, the present budgetary structure would seriously hinder internationalism. Without an international civil service that conforms to the conventional paradigm, however, the formulation of organisational policies that seek to reflect consensus on global interests is close to impossible.

30. Francis O. Wilcox, 'International Confederation—The United Nations and State Sovereignty', in Elmer Plischke, ed., *Systems of Integrating the International Community* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 52.

*The relatively weak position of organisational leadership.* One would expect heads of international organisations to give direction to the pursuit of global interests, but many observers have exaggerated the role of leadership in international organisation.<sup>31</sup> In emphasising the need for dynamic leadership in the face of political crises, analysts fail to give proper consideration to the built-in constraints of international administrative structures.

A proper scrutiny of permanent contracts, which have become unquestioned administrative practice in international organisations, is illustrative in this regard. They create a general immobilism that thwarts dynamic leadership. Executive heads have very little latitude to dismiss recalcitrant or incompetent officials for fear of irritating particular member states or interest groups. When the impact of permanent appointments is added to judicially determined administrative regulations, the ideal of organisational leadership is inhibited, if not paralysed. The most common solution to many administrative problems is usually called upon: the demotion, or assignment to a non-responsible post, of officials whose presence becomes a problem. Inevitably poor discipline, morale and inefficiency result from the presence of administrative 'dead wood'.

Top staff should not be seen in isolation but rather at the apex of a complex bureaucratic pyramid organised not primarily to seek consensus on global interests but rather to compromise on national views. Organisational reform conceived in terms of personality and leadership is not useful without making explicit the relevant assumptions about the composition and constraints of the international bureaucracy.

*Increasing size and heterogeneity of international administration.* The effect of an increasingly large and heterogeneous staff is central to the analysis of international bureaucracy. The commitment to universalism in membership and administrative staffing has necessitated that the administrative structures of international institutions reflect more and more the abundance of national, ideological, cultural, religious, and racial perspectives to be balanced in the process of policy-making. In addition, the proliferation of international secretariats and their tasks has been accompanied by a necessary increase in the total number of international officials. The extent and pace of the expansion of

31. For the impact of the two most widely recognised international officials, see the following biographical and analytic discussions: E. J. Phelan, *Yes and Albert Thomas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); and Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of the Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). In addition, the reader might also wish to consult: David Coombes, *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Robert W. Cox, 'An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1969, pp. 205-30; Amatai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1965); G. Fischer, *La Compétence du Secrétaire Général* (Paris: AFDI, 1965); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Robert S. Jordan, *The NATO International Staff Secretariat, 1952-57* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); S. M. Schwebel, *The Secretary-General of the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); and F. Van Langenhove, *Le Rôle Prééminent du Secrétaire Général dans l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964).

membership and bureaucratic structures are not analogous to the League's experience, although comparisons have often been made.<sup>32</sup>

An increase in numbers of officials representing national interests inhibits administrative ability to act on supranational interests. Leon Lindberg's analysis of the EEC's administration is even more appropriate to the larger and more variegated ones of international institutions:

The French were not the only ones in the Six who had serious reservations about the effects of widening the community . . . An increase in the numbers of participants would both overload the already complex decision-making system and decrease the willingness of Member States to make concessions and to adhere to the Community's code.

Judging by the experiences of the League and of the EEC, the United Nations will find that the increasing size of the bureaucracy results in a growing number of purely administrative problems. Increasing the number of perspectives increases the difficulty of compromise. Furthermore, officials have represented increasingly heterogeneous views since the end of the Second World War. A fundamental structural disequilibrium has been introduced into staffing the United Nations system.<sup>34</sup>

At the founding of the United Nations, it was recognised that considerable effort and care would be required to achieve an internal administrative consensus. However, the magnitude of the change resulting from the inundation of new staff representing nations that either had not participated in the League or which were to become independent, could not have been anticipated. Further, an unforeseen and crucial complication arose because of the gradual acceptance and justification of nationalism among international officials as standard operating procedures.

32. The build-up of the League's Secretariat occurred slowly from 182 officials in 1920 to 451 in 1925. In 1956 alone, 2,900 appointments were made for the United Nations. See: Robert Rhodes James, 'The Evolving Concept of the International Civil Service in Jordan,' ed., *International Administration, op. cit.*, p. 62. Another consideration is that as the League's staff grew numerically, the proportion of participating member states represented in the international civil service increased from 40 to 80 per cent by 1938. For a more detailed analysis of all the personnel figures in the 1920-38 period, see: Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat, op. cit.*, pp. 356-57.

33. Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 294.

34. Additions to the staff and concomitant disruptions of the League of Nations provide an analogy, on a smaller scale, for the United Nations. Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer attributed the early successes of the League to the international loyalty of the staff. One contributing factor was the homogeneity in the cultural and administrative backgrounds of most of the early League's officials. The majority of officials, liberal in their political orientation, came from that part of the middle-class which had supplied European governments for about 100 years with the upper rung of public officials. Among other things, the British and French also maintained control over most of the top leadership posts. Even the entrance of the Soviet Union in the League from 1934 to 1939 did little to disrupt the unity of the ideological vision within the administrative staff, since the Soviets claimed only one position in the Secretariat at any time. Also, the United States never became a member, although a few officials were United States citizens. See: Ranshofen-Wertheimer *International Secretariat, op. cit.*, pp. 406-8.

### Updating the paradigm of the international civil service

The preceding analysis has seriously questioned the conventional conception of the international civil service, although the paradigm remains relatively unchallenged within international administrative circles and is virtually ignored by scholars. Critical internal examinations by international administrations rarely transcend superficial problems such as supervision, recruitment, and language training. Still lacking are structural analyses of a crucial problem: the incompatibility between the present administrative structure of international organisation and the United Nations' stated redistributive goals.

Decisions are not the results of a common struggle by officials to formulate policy based on a conception of world interests, but rather of bureaucratic struggles to implement programmes designed to avoid irritating member states whose views are stratified in the presence of officials. The quota system, the control exerted by member states over recruitment and promotion, the external political climate and budgetary strings, the relatively weak position of organisational leaders, and the increasing size and heterogeneity of the staff more than suffice to show that the idealised international civil servant is more myth than reality.

The deterioration of the concept of an autonomous international civil service is particularly distressing because the international staff has acquiesced in the process. Although the political pressures exerted on United Nations officials are not imaginary, such pressures are much less formidable than is usually thought to be the case, and could be more easily counteracted than most officials realise. As one United Nations personnel officer has stated: 'It is not so much that the political pressure is intense, but that our resistance is so low.'<sup>35</sup> One explanation for this lack of a strong stance by international officials is the role that national governments play in lobbying for higher level promotions. Most officials believe that resistance to political pressures would achieve little—except to make life difficult for their own superiors and to irritate officials in national missions—while co-operation in permitting political pressures might enhance the possibilities for promotion.

That the original strategy of international organisations was predicated upon internationalism in administration suggests a potential lever for change. It is not only the impotence of international administrations in the face of political problems that thwarts more dynamic initiatives. Even technical assistance becomes a field for unnecessary ideological confrontation within a politicised bureaucracy that is not pledged to overcoming parochialism. To deny the value of reforms in international administration underestimates the important future prospects of present reforms. By making international civil servants more effective agents for decision-making about global interests, the international administration would gradually become more universally recognised as a voice

35. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.



for the interests of the world community. If international administrations were to become more widely accepted as advocates for global interests, then governmental elites threatened by crises would have established structures to which to submit conflicts or to provide additional funds. In much the same way that eminent Swiss citizens are considered neutral agents and called upon through the international Red Cross in emergencies, a reformed global civil service would prepare itself to assume the role of well-recognised decision-maker for the global village in welfare matters.

The previous analysis suggests three types of reform that are both necessary and feasible in order to convert the international administration, as presently constituted, into a more appropriate vehicle for the improvement of human welfare. Although change in this area is inherently slow, it is not impossible.

The first general recommendation is to make international institutions more flexible by reducing their size and jurisdiction and by simultaneously decentralising their operations.<sup>36</sup> This recommendation contradicts the dominant trend in recent analyses towards consolidation of budgetary and decision-making control as the panacea for all shortcomings of the UN system. The much discussed *Capacity Study*, for example, lamented the fact that specialised agencies had become 'the equivalent of principalities, free from any centralised control'.<sup>37</sup> There is no technical reason why large departments or functional divisions of specialised agencies could not be made more autonomous, while receiving subsidies from parent organisations. Pertinent decisions could potentially be made more rapidly and with less disagreement by the parties ultimately responsible for their implementation. Decentralisation could also counterbalance the increasing bureaucratic depersonalisation so characteristic of large societies and institutions.<sup>38</sup> International secretariats could encourage grass-roots participation and initiate small-scale projects in many parts of the world, in which the final decision-making authority would be vested in global civil servants in the field and local communities rather than in staff at headquarters. A freedom, flexibility, and intensity in welfare programmes, virtually unknown in existing international bureaucracies, could result.

The second general recommendation is that various measures should be taken to increase the commitment to planetary interests by international officials. Geographical quotas and national pressures legitimise and

36. In making this argument, one cannot ignore the obvious problems that decentralisation might involve (log-rolling, higher administrative costs); but there are also major advantages that do not often receive much attention. For an extensive study of the United Nations field system and some of its decentralisation dilemmas, see: Walter R. Sharp, *Field Administration in the United Nations System* (London: Stevens, 1961), in particular pp. 181-292. In a similar context, a recommendation has been proposed to decrease the size and longevity of United States foundations in order to increase their creativity and stimulative effect on society. See: Waldemar Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

37. Jackson, *Capacity Study*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. v.

38. Decentralisation corresponds to Alvin Toffler's proposals to cope with rapid change through 'ad hococracy'. Toffler attempts to avoid the pitfalls of centralisation and bureaucratisation by assembling groups to work on concrete problems and by specifying that they are to be dismantled on a particular date. See: Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970), especially 'Organization: The Coming Ad Hococracy', pp. 112-35.

institutionalise national interests, thereby postponing the moment when non-nation state interests become the legitimate and feasible standard for decision-making in global secretariats. Governments have already agreed in theory to relinquish control over their nationals. In fact, a straightforward publicity campaign against practices such as clearances or seconding by nation-states could diminish national influence over the selection and performance of international personnel.

Observers generally agree that, in contrast with the United Nations, the staff of the League of Nations (particularly in the early years) was far more neutral and sought to counterbalance pressures from their national governments.<sup>39</sup> Officials of the United Nations are far more likely to confuse their own national interests with supranational ones. They identify loyalty for the most part with their own national, cultural, or ideological background, and not with a concept that goes beyond, and in some sense above, such parochial concerns. As long as the world community is not considered to have interests separate from the narrowly conceived visions of nations or blocs, the redistributive goals of international organisations are unattainable. Until the necessity to have international administrators for the international community is recognised, international secretariats—as a grouping of conflicting loyalties—must continue to avoid, or deal ineffectively with, sensitive supranational policy issues central to human survival with dignity.<sup>40</sup> Member states should be forced to re-examine the costs and benefits of political pressures in light of the needs of interdependence. That some members engage in pressure tactics is no pretext for other members to be permitted to abandon principles of non-interference without a public protest from organisational leaders.

The overriding basis for action by an international civil service should be loyalty to the world community and to supranational perspectives. Ironically, the geographical quota system reinforces the acceptability and validity of national loyalties in the heart of international organisation, promoting precisely what international administration was theoretically erected to overcome.

Geographical quotas should be eliminated as the most crucial component in selecting candidates, certainly at the junior and middle-level professional levels. As a minimum, governments must be required to submit more than one candidate for any given senior position when a post 'belongs' to a particular

39. See: Siotis, *Essai, op. cit.*, p. 161; and Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat, op. cit.*, p. 248.

40. Observers of regional co-operation reject the necessity for such changes or the feasibility of institutionalising objective supranational interests; and they define valid interests as those that arise from compromises among national viewpoints and objectives. They argue accordingly that the success of the European Commission stems from confrontation among officials in Brussels. Compromises thereby represent a European rather than a particular national interest. The pooling of interests may be valid for institutions whose scope is limited, but is unacceptable for global secretariats. Confrontation among officials representing national perspectives is unsuitable for administering development projects whose benefits are not equally distributed. In fact, the financial burden of international welfare falls upon those national governments that profit least, directly or in the short run, from technical assistance to improve human welfare.

country. While quota systems are not without value in guaranteeing variety and freshness of perspectives, there are several alternatives that are not bounded by national frontiers. Quotas could be based on age, sex, race, language-grouping, length of service, or some combination thereof. A balanced criss-cross among these categories could reduce the internal impediments to dynamic programming on welfare matters within international secretariats.

During all recent sessions of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has been requested to take a series of measures to alter the composition of the secretariat.<sup>41</sup> Although excessive emphasis continues to be given to geographical quotas, prominence is also given to selection of candidates who are young or female—*i.e.*, new types of quotas that could potentially provide candidates who are less committed to nationalistic perspectives than their predecessors and less linked to national civil services. Further, stateless individuals should not be shunned automatically by the international civil service; in fact, a quota for them would be more likely to result in committed international officials than reliance upon national government secondments. Also, staff members from over-represented states who have been serving loyally for ten years could be considered in yet another type of quota.

The third recommendation is to reconsider the commitment to competitive salaries and permanent contracts in international organisations. These measures, originally intended to ensure a qualified and secure staff, have too frequently resulted in organisational paralysis and bureaucratic 'dead wood'. In fact, much could be said for discouraging or excluding individuals attracted primarily by comfortable settings, high salaries, and privileges. Several non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and the American Friends Service Committee have demonstrated that an effective and idealistic service agency can develop without salaries commensurate with those in related professions. Salaries could be more closely geared to local standards; and headquarters staff could have less attractive salary scales than those of field staff (instead of equivalent and even higher ones) to stimulate the exodus of qualified personnel from the Organisation's headquarters in developed countries to field assignments. The United Nations system should modernise its recruiting procedures to eliminate favouritism. Additional measures to find and attract the most competent candidates—examination systems, computerised roster, contacts with professional associations, and wider publicity for vacancies—are already used by corporations, private research institutions, and universities. They could and should be used far more widely to improve the calibre of international officials.<sup>42</sup>

41. The interested reader is referred to the most recent annual publication from the Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services, 'Action taken by the General Assembly on Personnel Questions during the Thirty-Fifth Session', Doct. ST/IC/81/1, Feb. 19, 1981.

42. The level of competence and professionalism, even in the highest grades, is scandalous. The Joint Inspection Unit found that in 1970 only one candidate was considered and interviewed for a position in 63 per cent of the cases. Only 20 per cent of the D-1 and 28 per cent of the D-2 posts filled by persons without a basic

A continual infusion of new ideas through a more rapid turnover in personnel is also desirable. To accept without question the advisability of permanent contracts overlooks their negative influences. For the same reasons that permanent academic tenure is being reassessed, the concept of permanent contracts for international administration needs to be reevaluated. Permanent contracts have served as much to foster complacency in senior positions and to discourage younger officials as to protect the integrity of international secretariats. Consideration should be given to non-renewable, five-year contracts rather than permanent ones as a means to renew secretariats on a continuous basis. In addition to the increased use of independently recruited, short-term consultants, another alternative source of fresh perspectives might result from the wider utilisation of the United Nations volunteer programme, in particular to attract retired persons with the possibility of applying their skills to development. Consideration should also be given to an international competition to establish a prestigious visiting fellows programme by which highly motivated young persons could be involved in the work of United Nations organisations for a specifically fixed period of time. Accomplishments should be duly recognised, particularly by allowing staff members to attach their own names to documents and projects for which they are responsible and to publish books or articles in professional journals under their own names without prior clearance.

This article has analysed the bureaucratic structure of international institutions in an attempt to discern internal structures susceptible to change—an approach common to observers of the level of national decision-making but rare among students of international organisations. A decidedly negative evaluation of international administration, as presently constituted, results. However, there is no reason to accept the continual decline of the ideal of global civil service. The reforms here proposed demand no reversal of international legal precedents, and their feasibility is demonstrated by early experiences of the League of Nations. Further, the suggested reforms demand no additional finances; in fact, they would free existing finances for more programming.

If international organisations were considered effective service organisations, and if recruitment and promotion reflected commitment to internationalism, a qualified and devoted staff could be assembled. Reform would free monies for additional programming and provide a working example of the equity and justice (in the more consistent life-styles among professionals, support staff, and the local community) toward which the administrative effort is ultimately directed.

university degree. Even more striking, 31 per cent of P-4 and 18 per cent of P-5 posts are filled by persons who had never completed a single university course. Although a university degree or experience may not guarantee competence and wisdom, this kind of lack of education raises serious questions about the ability of supervisors to understand and to guide an increasingly complex world and technical assistance geared to it and it suggests the extent to which non-technical considerations dominate senior appointments and promotions to it; See: Bertrand, *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit*, A/8454, pp. 51-52 and 117.

The United Nations is a fragile organism at an early stage of development, and every effort must be made to nurture it. It is vital to reverse the movement away from the conventional paradigm and to create a global civil service. The potential utility of international institutions in the future will reflect the administrative realities of managing an interdependent world. As two observers have noted:

If the UN is to help design and administer programmes to meet these global needs, then not only must there be a political consensus among a certain minimum of member states; the member states must also have confidence in the ability of the UN's professional staff to do the assigned task competently.<sup>43</sup>

The international civil service has come to sacrifice imaginative initiatives to the imperatives of national interest bargaining and institutional security. The international administration has thus contributed significantly to past failures in co-operation. It must likewise figure predominantly in prescriptions for change.

43. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.