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Eurogroups, clientela, and the European Community

William Averyt

A new approach is suggested to analyze the relations between the EC and national administrations on the one hand and the EC and national interest groups on the other. Drawing from research in comparative politics and public administration, the essay examines the working relationship between a government agency and an interest group in order to see what functions each performs. Under certain conditions, there arises a situation called *clientela*, a close relationship between agency and group. When studying the EC, a crucial question concerns the reasons why an interest group would forsake a productive national relationship for a new one at the Community level. One conclusion suggests that the extent of national *clientela* will determine both the development of Community-level interests groups as well as the strength of EC-national interest group linkages.

I Introduction

The complexities of the institutional structure of the European Community, the curious combination of national and supranational jurisdictions, and the variety of governmental and private actors render most difficult a satisfying explanation of Community politics. The institutions of the EC are certainly not quite like anything ever produced by a national system. But this hardly means, as some members of the European Commission and some theorists have maintained, that these institutions

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are unique, *sui generis*.¹ One could point to equally confusing systems in the past, such as the Holy Roman Empire or the German Confederation. The job of the analyst is not to praise the uniqueness of a system; he must rather try to understand how it works.

This essay is an attempt to *summarize* and *conceptualize*. It presents a new conceptual scheme, drawn from the fields of comparative politics and public administration, which can be used to produce hypotheses on how interest groups and the national and EC institutions interact. It will first consider the literature on interest group-government relations in order to summarize the variables which affect these relations. Second, it will review the research on the European Community in order to see how and why the fledgling EC institutions maintain contact with professional groups. The findings of interest group research on national political systems will be applied to the EC arena in order to present some general concepts which may prove useful in analyzing EC decision making.

What is the condition of current research on the EC? It is hardly in a better state than the American policy studies of which Lowi wrote when he assessed the current interest group literature.² Research on interest groups in separate national systems was just becoming popular as various supranational projects were being debated in Europe in the 1950s, and this European-led research proved no more successful than its American counterparts in finding a set of common assumptions, questions, and typologies.³ At the same time, the Social Science Research Council was sponsoring cross-national research on interest groups and bureaucracies which aspired to general validity and comparability.⁴ By the end of the 1950s, LaPalombara was criticizing the prodigal use of general interest group theory in comparative research which resulted in neglect of middle-range empirical propositions: "Much is written, but little research is conducted, on the obvious problem of *demonstrating* how certain variables regarding interest groups, the political culture, or the char-

¹ Jean Siotis, "Some Problems of European Secretariats," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, II (1964): 222 ff; Pierre Duclos, "La politification: trois exposer," *Politique, revue internationale des doctrines et des institutions*, XIV (April-June, 1961): 23-72. Siotis criticizes Commission members and Duclos for these extreme claims.

² Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics* XVI (July, 1964): 677-715.

³ Jean Meynaud pointed out the problems with this research in "Les 'groupes de pression' en Europe Occidentale: état des travaux," *Revue française des sciences politiques*, IX, 1 (March 1959): 229-46.

⁴ Gabriel Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review* LII, 1 (March 1958): 270-82, reprinted in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, ed., *Comparative Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1963): 397-407. The SSRC scheme, as presented by Almond, is marred by its obvious penchant for a "neutral" bureaucracy, an "effective" parliament, "moderate" interest groups, and "disciplined" parties. The United Kingdom obviously emerges as the winner. See p. 406 in Almond, in Eckstein and Apter.

acter of political institutions and policy makers affect the political process.”⁵ Theoretical concern for carefully designed research on interest groups and the political process was evident, therefore, at the very moment that the EC was to add a new dimension to European interest group activity.

In the light of these developments, it is not surprising that research on interest groups in the EC context lagged both in quantity and quality. In order to distinguish between national interest groups and interest groups established at the Community level, which are composed of national groups, we shall refer to the latter as “Eurogroups” and to the former simply as “interest groups.” The number of Eurogroups has grown rapidly since the foundation of the EC in 1958; there are now more than 300 Eurogroups in operation.⁶ In quantity, the number of works on Eurogroups, as well as on the activities of national interest groups in the new setting, is small. Only about a dozen works have been produced, and most of these have been written by European scholars such as Meynaud and Sidjanski. With regard to quality, they tend to be descriptive or legalistic.⁷

⁵ Joseph LaPalombara, “The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations,” *Journal of Politics* XXII (February 1960): 29–49; reprinted in Eckstein and Apter, pp. 421–30; p. 430.

⁶ Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski, *Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne: 1958–1968* (Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1971), p. 383.

⁷ The major American writer on interest groups in the EC, and perhaps the first to assign major theoretical importance to them, is Ernst Haas. See his “Challenge of Regionalism,” *International Organization* XIII (1958): 440–58; *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), a study of labor, professional and party organizations in the European Coal and Steel Community; “Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe,” in Stephen Graubard, ed., *A New Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964): pp 62–88, which presents politics and economics as part of a continuum and hopes for the dominance of economic questions in politics because of the spur to supranationalism which this will provide. The literature on Haas’ theory of neofunctionalism is vast; for a review and a critique, see Andrew Wilson Green, “Review Article: Mitrany Reread with the Help of Haas and Sewell,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* I (September 1969): 50–69. Two attempts to apply Haas’ perspectives to the Community, both on the subject of British membership, are: Robert J. Lieber, *British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), and Michael J. Brenner, *Technocratic Politics and the Functionalist Theory of European Integration* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1969).

General surveys of EC groups are: Dusan Sidjanski, “Pressure Groups and the European Community,” *Government and Opposition* II (1967): 397–416; Karl Neunreither, “Wirtschaftsverbände im Prozess der Europäischen Integration,” in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Politische Dimensionen der Europäischen Gemeinschaftsbildung* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968): 358–442; Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski, *Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne: 1958–1968*; Jean Meynaud, “Les groupes de pression dans la CEE,” in P. Gerbet and D. Pepy, eds., *La décision dans les Communautés européennes* (Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1969): pp 297–320; Carl J. Friedrich, *Europe: An Emergent Nation?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Europa Institut, *Pressiegroepen in de EEG* (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1965); Werner Feld, “National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC,” *Political Science Quarterly* LXXXI, 2 (June 1966): 392–411; Fritz Fischer, *Die Institutionalisierte Vertretung der Verbände in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1965).

For labor, see: Marguerite Bouvard, *Labor Movements in the Common Market Countries: the Formation of a European Pressure Group* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Colin Beever, *European*

Those works which do attempt to provide a theoretical interpretation of group processes within the EC are mainly concerned with either supporting or refuting the neofunctional argument. (The transactional analyses, concerned with the direction, volume, and rate of international exchanges, do not address interest group behavior specifically.) The neofunctional theory claims, of course, that professional interest groups will increasingly shift their attention, activities, and allegiance from national to supranational centers, thus bypassing the national political system (see note seven). Concern with neofunctionalism is evident, for example, in the works by Friedrich, Muth, and to some extent of Fischer. Heathcote, on the other hand, organizes her critical and perceptive view of agricultural policy in the EC around a scathing attack on the neofunctional position.

At this time, most scholars would agree that the neofunctional school simply does not supply the most useful hypotheses for examining EC politics. Furthermore, the events after 1965 have proved the bankruptcy of the theory in explaining the evolution of EC-national government interest group relations. Perhaps the major shortcoming of the neofunctional approach when applied to agency-group relationships is its assumption of an administrative *tabula rasa*, of the willingness of interest groups to renounce old, established government relationships and long-standing personal contacts for the unknown offices in Brussels. No consideration is given to the fact that administrative change is a cost, and that there must be major rewards for undertaking it. Thus, an analysis of Community politics based mainly on a denial of neofunctionalism is misdirected: Instead of spending their efforts on proving what the EC is *not*, analysts would do better to investigate more precisely what, in fact, the EC is at the present time.

Most of the remaining general surveys of interest groups and Eurogroups in the EC are either journalistic, such as Zeller's book, or a formalistic listing of endless committees and working groups, such as Nielsen's essay.

The few notable exceptions attempt to describe and account for the flow of demands and information by organized groups and civil servants. Feld attempts to

Unity and the Trade Union Movement (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1960); P. M. Vigtel, "Fagbovegelsen sem interessegruppe ved EEC," [Trade Unions as Interest Groups in the EEC], *International Politics* (Bergen), V (1968): 511-27.

For business and professional groups, see: Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski, *L'Europe des affaires* (Paris: Payot, 1967); W. P. Grant, "British Employers' Associations and the Enlarged Community," *Journal of Common Market Studies* XI, 4 (June 1973): 276-86; Werner J. Feld, *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Janos Szokoloczy-Syllaba, *Les organisations professionnelles françaises et le Marché Commun* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965).

For agriculture, see: Nina Heathcote, *Agricultural Politics in the European Community* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1971); Terkel T. Nielsen, "Aspects of the EEC influence of European Groups in the Decision-Making Process: the Common Agricultural Policy," *Government and Opposition* VI, 4 (Autumn, 1971): 539-58; Alan D. Robinson, *Dutch Organized Agriculture in International Politics* (The Hague: A. Nijhoff, 1961); Hanns Peter Muth, *French Agriculture and the Political Integration of Western Europe* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970); Adrien Zeller and Jean-Louis Giraudy, *L'imbroglia agricole du Marche Commun* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1970).

find out whether, why, and to what extent national interest groups will turn from their national channels of access and attempt to use the Community arena. Meynaud and Sidjanski (1971) provide, in addition to an encyclopedic presentation of Eurogroups in all economic sectors, some general explanations of why specific Eurogroups act as they do: the difficulties they encounter in organizing, coordinating national positions, and obtaining effective levers of influence within the EC institutional structure.

Lacunae abound in this literature, but one in particular is astounding: there seems to be a total absence of case studies of Eurogroups, either concerning the enactment of a particular set of regulations or depicting the operation of a specific organized group over time. The only study which approaches a detailed case study is Szczokoloczy-Syllaba's work on the French cotton, wool, electricity, and automobile professional organizations and their relationship to the EC. This, however, concentrates on the reaction of national groups, not on the newer Eurogroups.

Thus, after two decades of investigation, we still do not have a satisfactory conceptual scheme—much less a growing body of established middle-level hypotheses—which could illuminate how EC institutions, national administrations, and interest groups interact. Among the hitherto unformulated or unanswered questions are the following:

1. When the EC intrudes into an administrative area which has previously been the exclusive domain of national ministries, what are the consequences? If the national ministry and its clientele groups have enjoyed, up to this point, satisfying working relationships, how do they respond to this change? Under what conditions will an interest group act to preserve its old relationship with its national ministry?

2. When Eurogroups are formed, what are they used for? When does a national interest group leader turn to the Eurogroup to further his goals? Are there certain kinds of goals which can be pursued more effectively by the Eurogroup than by the national groups?

3. When do the Commission and other EC organs use national interest groups, as opposed to Eurogroups, to fulfill many of the tasks of the agency-group relationship (discussed below)?

This essay will hardly answer these questions, but it will attempt to provide a theoretical approach which can orient empirical research. We now turn to a few major propositions drawn from the literature on national interest groups, followed by a discussion of the relevance of these propositions to the EC.

II Interest groups and national administrations

We are focusing on the relationship between national groups and national bureaucracies, while ignoring the group-parliament relationship, for one major reason: For all practical purposes, the EC institutions do not include a parliament. The European Parliament at Strasbourg lacks effective power to shape EC deci-

sions.⁸ Not only is there no EC parliament, but national parliaments have great difficulty influencing EC policy. The principal relationships are group-bureaucratic relationships, and we will focus on these in the remainder of the essay.

From the beginning Europe has been the work of technical elites without democratic participation. In fact, democratic participation most likely would have been a major obstacle to reaching agreements. In addition, the Community which has been constructed has the tendency to repeat in a more intensified form what happens on the national level: the drift of major decision-making powers to executive bodies.⁹

Hence, in searching for interesting propositions in the national interest group literature, we shall concentrate on that part of it which concerns national bureaucracies.

Throughout this essay, the term "interest group" will refer to formal organizations seeking to present their views to those in governmental positions of power. "Clientele group" will refer to a collection of individuals sharing an economic or professional occupation and directly affected by the regulations of an administrative agency. No determinism is implied, although clientele groups usually form interest groups to further certain ends.

The interest group-bureaucratic relationship has become extremely important in Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century. First, governments engage in more activities which affect more people more deeply than ever before. In his superb discussion of "collectivist politics" in the United Kingdom, Beer emphasizes the dominant role of the government in running the "Welfare State" and the "Managed Economy." These two spheres of activity are not separable:

The Managed Economy and the Welfare State [are] not two separate and distinct activities of the pattern of policy. Action to maintain full employment comes under both headings. A change in direct taxation is both a measure of economic policy (affecting prices, imports, saving, and incentives) and a measure of social policy (affecting the distribution of disposable income among various social strata).¹⁰

⁸The importance of the European Parliament, rather, lies in the possible expansion of its powers in the future. Federalists and Socialists decry the lack of democratic mechanisms linking the European electorates to the EC institutions and urge direct elections and expanded powers for the European Parliament. See Steven Joshua Warnecke, "The European Community After British Entry: Federation or Confederation?" in Warnecke, ed., *The European Community in the 1970's* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 5; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Guardian* (Manchester), August 3, 1971, p. 2-G. For the complex details of plans to increase the European Parliament's budgetary powers, see: David Coombes and Ilka Wiebecke, *The Power of the Purse in the European Communities* (London: Chatham House, 1972).

⁹Warnecke, p. 21.

¹⁰Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 319.

Government is making rules and allocating resources for great numbers of people, which increases the likelihood that those most directly affected will wish to try to control this process (this will be taken up in point three below).

Second, policy making is increasingly shifted from the parliament to the executive and the bureaucracy. Delegated legislation has increased in the United States, France, Italy—indeed, in practically every Western nation.¹¹

Third, with this shift in the locus of decision making comes a corresponding shift in interest group activity. In Key's words: "Where power rests, there influence is brought to bear."¹² And Lane asserts that interest groups "have been and are active . . . wherever governmental decisions affecting their membership are made."¹³ These assertions must be carefully qualified, however. They assume that there are no "stupid" interest groups,¹⁴ that the political culture views this type of action as legitimate,¹⁵ that governmental structures permit it,¹⁶ and that the groups have the resources to do it.¹⁷ However, we do not wish to engage in a critique of general interest group theory, but rather to focus on the group-bureaucracy relationship.

Is there any body of concepts which have been used profitably in research on interest group-bureaucratic relations in national systems? LaPalombara's concept of *clientela* seems especially interesting in the Community context. In his *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, *clientela* is defined as a "clientelistic relationship between groups and the bureaucracy."¹⁸ Italian interest groups will seek to influence the bureaucracy because (1) it makes rules; (2) the complexity of national policies means that more and more power is delegated to specialists in the bureaucracy who are able to understand the technicalities of the situation; and (3) the growth of the welfare state means that more activities are undertaken and consequently more

¹¹ For the US, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); for France, see: Maurice Duverger, *Institutions politiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 479 ff.; for Italy see: Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1964), chap. 8. One may argue that functions are not in fact shifting from parliament to the executive; rather, in earlier times parliaments never engaged in certain tasks such as economic planning or the provision of welfare services. As these tasks arose, they were taken up immediately by the executive.

¹² V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1956), p. 168.

¹³ Edgar Lane, "Interest Groups and Bureaucracy," *Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science* CCXCII (March 1954); 105.

¹⁴ Sometimes those groups which would seem to have a great interest in an issue lie dormant even though they have adequate organizational resources: See Raymond Bauer, Lewis Dexter, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

¹⁵ But the political culture may view pressure on certain issues as improper; see Brenner, chap. 2.

¹⁶ Sometimes the government structure may be so byzantine that even the most savvy lobbyist is at a loss to know whether or not a government official actually did fulfill his promise of support; see Lewis Dexter, "The Job of the Congressman," in Raymond Wolfinger, ed., *Readings on Congress* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971); pp 69–89.

¹⁷ Time, money, and energy are, of course, rarely evenly distributed.

¹⁸ LaPalombara, p. 254.

administration is needed.¹⁹ The *clientela* relationship becomes firmly established when “an interest group . . . succeeds in becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or reference point for the activity of the administrative agency.”²⁰ A group becomes the “natural representative” in certain conditions, which can be detected by examining certain *agency variables* as well as certain *group variables*.

The *agency variables* are as follows:

1. the vertical nature of the administrative agency: it is concerned with one social sector (business, labor, etc.);
2. regulatory activity is modal: the job of the agency is to regulate that sector: the agency has to depend on the groups it is supposed to regulate for cooperation and information;
3. the agency is perceived by itself and by the clientele group as serving the interests of the regulated;
4. the agency needs more than its own initiative to regulate: it needs the cooperation of those who are to be regulated;
5. the agency lacks full control over information: the regulated groups possess a better technical staff or better information than the agency;
6. the agency-group relationship is reciprocal: both want to know and influence the actions of the other.²¹

The *interest group variables* are:

1. the bureaucracy prefers to deal with *representative* group clients;
2. the group must be respectable: it must not embarrass the agency;
3. the group must be able to be an *effective* instrument of contact between the agency and the clientele group; it itself must therefore be well organized;
4. the group must be authoritative: it must be able to make binding rules on its own constituent subgroups; the subgroups must not outflank the group by going directly to the agency;
5. the interest group must be physically close to the agency, i.e., it must maintain offices in the city where the agency headquarters are located.²²

Clientela is thus a relationship rooted in long-term interests shared by the interest group and the agency. The long-term interests, however, are specific and well-bounded, as opposed to an issue orientation, which is more general and transcends particular economic or professional interests. LaPalombara contrasts the stable *clientela* relationship of Confindustria with the Ministry of Industry with the

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 255–6.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 262.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 271–84.

²² Ibid., pp. 285–303.

issue orientation of Catholic Action, which must generate fresh support for each new issue.

Although some writers have condemned any close association between an administrative agency and a clientele group or an interest group,²³ others have tried to discover what effects such a relationship has on both agency and group.

Concern with the relations between formal structures and informal groups can be traced back to Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive*, first published in 1938.²⁴ Although Barnard limited his discussion to social groups which were not institutionally organized, his work was one of the first to explain how these informal groups aided the formal structure in the areas of communication and cohesiveness.

In the 1940s political scientists began to examine agency-group relations. A classic statement of agency-group analysis is Long's essay on "Power and Administration." We can hardly improve on Long's terse comments on the agency's need for group support:

Legal authority and a treasury balance are necessary but politically insufficient bases of administration.

The agencies to which tasks are assigned must devote themselves to the creation of an adequate consensus to permit administration.

Agencies and bureaus more or less perforce are in the business of building, maintaining, and increasing their political support.²⁵

Research in the following years attempted to discover the conditions under which close agency-group relations arose.

Rourke summarizes the main findings on agency-group relations: The group which the administrative agency serves directly is usually the best source of support for the agency. A growing identity of interest may arise between the agency and the clientele group, acting through its interest group, which may even supply officials to the agency. Often the agency will actually create or encourage the formation of a formal interest group based on the clientele group. One possible outcome of a close agency-group relationship is that the agency may actually become a "captive" of the group which it set out to regulate.²⁶

²³ E.g., Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 135 ff.

²⁴ Chester Barnard, *The Function of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971; original edition, 1938), pp. 115–22.

²⁵ Norton E. Long, "Policy and Administration," *Public Administration Review* IX, 4 (Autumn, 1949); 257–9.

²⁶ Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 14–19. The process whereby an agency is "captured" is presented in Marvin Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), and "Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Perspective on their Reform," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* CD (March 1972); 14–26.

Of course, many factors affect the interest group's effectiveness, quite apart from the nature of the administrative agency. Zeigler and Peak²⁷ in their comprehensive survey of American interest groups, present the major factors: the size of the group, its material resources, the number and compatibility of its goals, and the nature of its leadership.²⁸ And both the interest group and the agency may follow various "strategies of influence." The interest group may choose a favorable agency, attempt to secure "good" appointments to the agency, concentrate its energies where they will be most effective. The agency, on the other hand, can use publicity to expose and ward off unwelcome influences and reduce the homogeneity of the interest group by creating competing groups.²⁹

Therefore, in a *clientela* relationship we should be alert to the changes in the behavior of both agency and interest group as well as sensitive to the characteristics of the actors which favor the establishment of *clientela*.

One final consideration should be mentioned before we turn to analyzing EC politics from the perspectives developed above, and this concerns the extension of *clientela* throughout a political system. To the extent that *clientela* becomes the dominant relationship between social groups and governmental institutions, a corporate system is approached. Schmitter defines corporatism as:

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.³⁰

Schmitter points out that the corporatist takes for granted the "growing importance of formal associational units of representation," the increasing role of "permanent administrative staffs, of specialized staffs, of specialized information, of technical expertise," and—most interesting from the EC viewpoint—the "decline in the importance of territorial and partisan representation."³¹

These developments which supposedly permit the growth of a corporate system are similar to those which Beer mentions as the common ground of "Socialist" and "Tory Democracy:" party government, functional representation by the great organized producer groups, downgrading of parliamentarism, and opposition to nineteenth century individualism.³²

²⁷ L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972, second edition).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. 3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168–80.

³⁰ Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics* XXXVI, 1 (January 1974): 94–5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³² Beer, p. 70.

If the various analyses summarized in the previous pages are correct, then several general theories of democratic politics must be reexamined. The Rousseauist picture of an ideal system in which no secondary groups intervene between the citizen and the state is clearly inapplicable to industrialized democracies. The Madisonian vision of a polity structured so that many factions jostle and compete to further their goals must be qualified. Kornhauser's³³ defense of intermediate associations which stand between "elites" and "masses," and which prevent excessive accessibility of the elites to mass demands as well as inhibiting the mobilization of the mass by elites, is more compatible with the findings of the studies mentioned in this essay. Kornhauser does not, however, consider the basic point made by Barnard, Selznick, Beer, Rourke, LaPalombara, and others, which is this: Under certain conditions (and these conditions often occur in industrialized democracies) *government agencies need interest groups to carry out their programs*. The interest groups are not simply buffers placed between the state and the individual (which is the impression given by Kornhauser),³⁴ rather they are instrumental for the state. They are integral parts of the long process whereby government policy is carried through to the citizenry.

We began this section by looking at the reasons for the increasing importance of interest group-bureaucracy relationships in modern Western nations. Under certain conditions, a highly structured, close working relationship, which we have called *clientela*, would arise between these two organizational actors. A set of variables for the administrative agency and for the interest group influences the formation and strength of the *clientela* relationship.

We now turn to the EC system, specifically to the relations between EC institutions, Eurogroups, and national interest groups. Using the *clientela* variables as guiding questions, we shall examine the nature of agency-group relations in the EC.

III Clientela and EC politics

The *clientela* variables may be profitably applied to EC politics. This is not to imply that, for example, every group-agency relationship within the European Commission will be strongly clientelistic. Some Directorates-General of the Commission have been unable to establish a satisfactory relationship with the clientele group, and little headway has been made in formulating a Community policy in

³³ William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1959).

³⁴ "Whenever there is expropriation of major social functions by large organizations, smaller groups lose their reason for existence." Kornhauser, p. 89. Kornhauser never considers the functions performed by interest groups regarding the formulation and implementation of public policy. For a discussion of these functions and a summary of the relevant literature, see Joseph LaPalombara, *Politics Within Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974), chap. 9.

that sector. This is the case for transportation.³⁵ In other areas, such as agriculture, a relationship approaching *clientela* has arisen between the Directorate-General and the interest groups, but even statements about this relationship must be carefully qualified. So it is premature to conclude that all group-bureaucracy relations in the EC are clientelistic, much less to conclude that the EC institutions are in the vanguard of some new corporatist movement.

In this connection it would be interesting to examine why certain sectors in the EC have witnessed the development of a far-reaching, activist policy, while others have not. This would go far beyond the bounds of this essay, however, which focuses on the nature of interest group-agency relations in those sectors in which the EC is already heavily involved.

What follows is an attempt to conceptualize agency-group relations in the EC by borrowing from the literature on national systems, specifically, from discussions of *clientela* variables and the role of interest groups.

If we speak of the aggregation of interests in the EC, we must speak of bureaucratic institutions. No other structures are available to perform this function. No representative assembly exists which could take articulated interests and weld them into public policy. Furthermore, no EC political parties exist which could do this. True, there are "European parties" within the European Parliament, but they are powerless because the European Parliament is powerless.³⁶ Finally, the national parliaments of the member states cannot effectively control the operation of EC institutions.

Customs, general trade, agriculture, cartel policy, the free movement of labour, etc., are now all Community responsibilities, and are not subject to parliamentary control *backed by sanctions* either from Strasbourg or the national parliaments. (Furthermore, in the case of the budget, national parliaments can only concern themselves with the contributions from their own States.)³⁷

The national parliaments can try to control the policies which their ministers are supporting in the Council of Ministers, but even if a national parliament forces the resignation of a minister after an objectionable vote in the EC Council, the vote itself is not changed and the policy becomes Community law.³⁸

Perhaps we should pause to consider the implications of the absence of party and parliament in the EC. In effect, what we are referring to is the absence of

³⁵ Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), chap. 5.

³⁶ By the late 1960s, there were four "European parties": Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and the European Democratic Union (Gaullist), organized across the national delegations in the European Parliament. Stuart de la Mahotiere, *Towards One Europe* (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin, 1970), p. 301.

³⁷ Stephen Holt, *The Common Market* (London, H. Hamilton, 1967) p. 86.

³⁸ William Pickles, "Political Power in the EEC," *Journal of Common Market Studies* II. 1 (1963): 84, note 8.

parentela, defined by LaPalombara as the close relationship between interest groups and the dominant political party in a national system.³⁹ Bureaucrats are generally hostile to *parentela* influences, which threaten their administrative functions, power, and independence. They do not like such outside interference.⁴⁰ It is extremely interesting, in this connection, to note the coolness with which the Commission has treated the European Parliament: "Neither the Commission nor the Council has taken parliamentary amendments into account, thus further strengthening the tendency of the Commission to seek intergovernmental agreement rather than specific parliamentary support."⁴¹ In part, of course, the Commission's slighting of the European Parliament is due to its manifest lack of power. Part of the Commission's reluctance to engage in substantive negotiation with the European Parliament, however, probably stems from a more general bureaucratic distrust of potential sources of *parentela* influence and interference.

In the absence of parliaments or parties, bureaucratic institutions dominate the EC system as the aggregating structures. The implications of this for the growth of *clientela* are obvious. Dealing with highly complex issues, eliciting mainly boredom from European electorates, lacking issue-oriented structures such as political parties or ideological movements which could provide linkages between the citizenry and the EC institutions, the Community seems to be a fertile ground for *clientela*.

However, recent EC developments work against such a possibility. The blurring of the functions of the Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the Commission means that it is no longer true (if it ever was) that "the Commission proposes and the Council disposes." Not only does the Commission engage in extensive discussion with national interest group representatives and national civil servants before drafting a proposal, it also heeds the advice of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Council, far from simply awaiting Commission proposals, has come to exercise considerable influence over their very formulation, a practice much at variance with the idealized picture of a Council which merely rules "yes" or "no" on Commission initiatives.⁴² And precisely because of this institutional development, national clientelistic relationships may operate so as to hinder, if not block, the growth of *clientela* on the EC level. Through the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, certain national interest groups may communicate their views without going to the trouble of extensive participation in a Eurogroup in order to approach the Commission.

Before looking at the specific *clientela* variables which shape the agency-group relationship in the EC, we should point out one supremely important factor,

³⁹ LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, p. 306.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 329-31.

⁴¹ F. A. M. Alting von Gesau, *Beyond the European Community* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1967), p. 56.

⁴² Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Community* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1967), p. 56.

⁴² Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 53.

i.e., the *power* of the agency. We can assume that, even though there may be some incompetent professional group leaders, few will waste their limited resources for very long in attempting to influence an agency which is patently impotent. For *clientela* to arise, then, the overriding requirement is that the agency have power to affect the fortunes of the interest group.⁴³

Do the EC institutions have this power? We will not state the particular responsibilities of the major institutions, but will rather emphasize the fact that power in the EC is not zero-sum. It would be erroneous to conclude that, because the Council is strong, the Commission is weak. It is more profitable to consider the Commission as an institution which identifies problems, assesses the stands of the relevant actors, gathers information, and formulates the policy proposals. It does these things in close consultation with the member governments and professional groups. The ideologues of European unity have overlooked the fact that the development of the EC system is not an "either-or" proposition. In Shonfield's words, "The essential truth—which is that the Common Market is in the first place a new and unusually powerful device for bargaining between friendly nations over a greatly extended range of subjects—tends to be overlooked."⁴⁴ The EC system will probably remain a jumbled, esthetically unsatisfying one, but it is important for the actors within its limited spheres of activity.

We now turn to an examination of the relationships between interest groups and the EC institutions mentioned above. We begin with the agency variables:⁴⁵

1. *The vertical nature of the agency*: All the major EC institutions are vertical and functional. (This may change if the EC embarks on a major program of regional development.) Even the Council, which may be thought to be an institution of territorial representation, conducts most of its business according to functional division of subject matter, which is decided by ministers from functional agencies in the national systems. The only possible counterweight to the functionality and verticality of these institutions is the European Parliament, and as we have seen this body has marginal importance for EC policy making.

2. *Regulatory activity is modal*: The EC definitely does make rules, an abundance of them, which touch many interest groups' activities very deeply. In the field of industry, the Commission rules on antitrust violations, for example.⁴⁶ In the field of agriculture, the separate market organizations, with their subsidy and stockpiling systems, have been progressively replaced with a single Community market organization. Within the market organization for each commodity group,

⁴³ I am indebted for this point to LaPalombara. One of the benefits of adapting theories of national interest groups to the EC is that it makes explicit certain assumptions which remain implicit for analyses of national systems, e.g., that all national ministries do in fact possess power to affect interest groups significantly. Interview, New Haven, Conn., May 1974.

⁴⁴ Andrew Shonfield, *The Listener*, November 20, 1969, p. 698.

⁴⁵ The descriptive phrases for the agency and group variables are taken from LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* chap. 8.

⁴⁶ *European Trends*, 35 (May 1973): 10–11.

Community prices have been set. Obviously, then, the EC is making rules which concern many interest groups.

In order to regulate, the regulated must cooperate to some extent: "Widespread opposition to regulation on the part of the regulated group would certainly tend to make the implementation of regulations very costly, and sometimes prohibitively so."⁴⁷ In the EC, the Eurogroups do not seem to oppose Community regulation in principle, at least not publicly. One will search in vain for a statement by Eurogroups, such as the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) in industry or the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) in agriculture, for a condemnation of the Community as a whole or even of the concept of Community regulation. Eurogroups instead concentrate their attacks on particular Community policies. With regard to national interest groups, initial suspicion of the EC in some countries such as France has given way to acceptance and cooperation with EC authorities. Perhaps the major exception to this development is the German farm organization, the *Deutscher Bauernverband* (DBV), which opposed the Community common agricultural policy from the beginning and continually sought to revise both the agricultural policy specifically and EC institutions in general during the 1960s.⁴⁸

A second aspect of the regulatory mode is communication between group and agency: "it is impossible to conceive of the regulatory process between administrative rule-maker and rule-applier and group client evolving very effectively except on the basis of a well-developed two-way channel of communication, with exchange of information."⁴⁹ In the EC, several channels of communication exist between agency and interest group (Eurogroup and national group). When the Commission is drafting a proposal, Eurogroups have access to the relevant Directorate-General through a variety of committees. In the field of agriculture, for example, consultative committees for each commodity bring together spokesmen for producers and agricultural cooperatives (50 percent of the committee), agricultural industries and commerce (25 percent), and agricultural workers and consumers (25 percent). The Commission asks the consultative committees for advice. But these committees are restricted to matters such as the administration of the market organizations; they cannot discuss price levels. In this respect, then, the Commission seems to have restricted the channel of advice and consultation in order to retain its own freedom of maneuver. Obviously there are tradeoffs in this kind of choice if the Eurogroups become increasingly frustrated at being unable to express opinions in institutionalized channels on questions which they consider crucial.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ LaPalombara, p. 273.

⁴⁸ For a description of Eurogroups and their attitudes toward EC regulation, see Friedrich, p. 307; Muth, *passim*. The DBV's policy is set forth in F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 288 ff.

⁴⁹ LaPalombara, *ibid.*, p. 274.

⁵⁰ Meynaud and Sidjanski, pp. 541-3.

Eurogroups may also express opinions through certain offices within the Directorate-General in their sector. Again, in agriculture, Division A-4 of the Directorate-General is charged with liaison with interest groups (“*les organisations non gouvernementales de l’agriculture*”). Yet, in the cautious phrase of one writer, this type of contact “is not the norm.”⁵¹ Indeed, it seems that the most important contacts with interest groups do not occur in the formal, institutionalized channels. Here, too, the Commission seems more desirous of maintaining its freedom of maneuver than obtaining full expression of Eurogroup attitudes and opinions, at least in institutionalized channels. Instead, personal contacts between the COPA Secretariat’s experts and the agricultural Directorate-General are frequent.

Furthermore, the Commission probably exercises great caution in not contacting “disreputable” groups, especially after the resolution of the 1965 crisis. The Luxembourg Accords of 1966 which ended this crisis put explicit restraints on the Commission’s contacts with national experts and international organizations, ordering it to clear these with the CPR.⁵² One may surmise that national governments are no less concerned about Commission contacts with its own professional groups.

The national interest groups, on the other hand, may continue to use their national ministries. These ministries not only supply, obviously, the Minister who will cast the decisive vote in the Council; they also supply the national officials who are consulted twice in the decision-making process, first by the Commission through the Management Committee and second by the CPR. It is in the Management Committee that the crucial questions of price levels are discussed. If the Commission refuses to follow the Management Committee’s recommendations, the Council is alerted and may overrule the Commission.⁵³ If national interest groups have good access to their national ministries, they may be able to affect the Commission’s proposals on price policy through the national officials on the Management Committee, even though the Commission has blocked the national groups from acting through the Eurogroups in the Consultative Committee on the price issue.

These national experts who participate in the Management Committees may be practically immune to representations by Eurogroups in Brussels. The reason is simple and clear: the experts usually arrive in Brussels in the morning, go directly to the Management Committee meeting, continue working through the afternoon, and return at night to their national capitals.⁵⁴ There is scarcely an opportunity for communication between Eurogroups and these experts. Thus, all the incentives operate to maintain the national channels of access intact.

3. “*Administration perceived as serving interests regulated*”: This varies according to economic sector, country, and number of groups in each sector. EC

⁵¹ Nielsen, p. 547.

⁵² Holt, p. 184.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁴ Helen Feldstein, interview, Providence, R.I., March 1974.

relations with industry have been fairly harmonious, partly perhaps because the EC does not have an active, interventionist policy in industrial matters. It merely ensures the lowering and abolition of trade restraints and tries to ensure observance of a code of competition. If, however, the EC began deciding on substantial matters, such as industrial wage levels, one would anticipate major changes in the activities of industrial interests groups and Eurogroups. In areas in which a more activist policy is pursued, however, agency-group relations are more easily upset. In agriculture, the situation was fairly good in the early 1960s, but group-agency relations in the EC deteriorated by the end of the decade when the Council froze common prices because of inflationary pressures and the Commission proposed the Mansholt Plan, which would have drastically reduced the number of farmers in the Community. One may hazard a guess that UNICE might regard the EC as attempting to promote its interests; COPA would probably not be so sanguine after 1967 or 1968.

Finally, unlike many national ministries, the "proto-ministries" of the EC, i.e., the various Directorates-General of the Commission, did not arise because of historical pressures for interest protection and promotion. Rather, they were organized after the entire project for the EC was decided upon due to larger political concerns. Specific Directorates-General therefore probably do not feel that it is their responsibility to protect or promote specific economic interests. This is especially true when the clientele group itself is beset by numerous cleavages, as is the case with agriculture. Does a defense of agricultural interests mean the protection of the small family farm at the cost of enormous economic inefficiency? Or does it mean the economic rationalization of agriculture, which entails both high subsidies for large-scale producers to compete in world markets and the depopulation of entire regions in the Community? Or some other equally unpalatable combination? Faced with such complexity within the clientele group, the agricultural Directorate-General is probably freer to seek its own definition of the "Community interest" than it would be if it were facing a relatively homogeneous clientele group confronted with one overriding problem.⁵⁵

4. *An administrative agency does not have full control over information:* The more interventionist EC agencies need increasing amounts of information in order to design their policies. They must therefore depend on the Eurogroups, the national groups, or the national ministries for information. The ability of the Commission to generate its own data is a field in which practically nothing has been written. Such a power is a sensitive one; national governments would rebel at any program by which factories, docks, and farm cooperatives would report directly to the Commission without channeling their information through the national ministries. The "great grain scandal" of 1973 provides a fascinating glimpse of Commis-

⁵⁵ Ehrmann points out that if an agency must deal with fragmented clienteles, it may be able to play one off against another and obtain considerable freedom of action. Henry Ehrmann, "French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests," *Administrative Science Quarterly* V (March 1961), p. 548.

sion weakness in the data field. Grain dealers were collecting huge subsidies for non-existent exports by bribing customs officials. Since the Commission lacked authority to examine the records of national farm bodies and customs officials, it could not verify the grain dealers' subsidy claims, much less control them.⁵⁶

It should be noted that, with the shift from the national to the European level, the national ministries may take over the function of providing technical information which had previously been frequently performed by the interest groups themselves. In this respect (and in others) EC institutions have two kinds of clientele groups, the national ministries and the national interest groups.

5. *The administrative-group relationship must be reciprocal:* Both the agency and the group must be willing to receive as well as give signals. In the EC, however, the institutions do not receive messages from all interest groups. The Commission, for example, will not publicly consult with national interest groups; it insists that they form Eurogroups before it negotiates with them.⁵⁷ In private, however, the Commission consults extensively certain key national interest groups.⁵⁸ Furthermore, not all would-be Eurogroups are accredited by the Commission. Thus the Commission refused to accredit a Eurogroup of Chambers of Commerce based not on national federations but directly on all European Chambers of Commerce.⁵⁹

The Commission's refusal to accredit national interest groups in effect works to the detriment of territorial grievances. The problems of Brittany and Calabria may have certain common causes, but the Commission will not accredit, for example, the Breton *Federation regionale des syndicats de l'Ouest*, a farm group attempting to reverse the economic deterioration of the region. And it is unlikely that Brittany, Calabria, and other areas will form a "Poor Regions" Eurogroup because of resource constraints, although some Bretons have advocated the establishment of such an organization.⁶⁰ Also, national interest groups may try to block direct access to EC institutions for regional groups. This happened, for example, when the French farm federation, the FNSEA, refused to give Breton emissaries to Brussels the help of its own Brussels-based experts, in spite of earlier promises of assistance.⁶¹ The Bretons, and similar groups, will therefore have to work through national ministries in order to have access to EC institutions.

The above cases concern the Commission's definition of what is and what is not a "legitimate" Eurogroup, deserving a hearing by the Commission. This will be discussed again below from the viewpoint of the interest group itself. But before concluding this discussion of the need for reciprocity between administrative agency and group, we might reemphasize the nature of access channels provided by

⁵⁶ Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Extensive Fraud Charged in Europe Farm Subsidies," *New York Times*, May 20, 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁷ Feld, "National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC," p. 402.

⁵⁸ Commission interviews, Brussels, June 1974.

⁵⁹ Friedrich, p. 78.

⁶⁰ Meynaud and Sidjanski, p. 214.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

the various EC institutions. Again, agriculture provides a good concrete example, since it is one of the areas of heaviest regulation and intervention. The Commission, in spite of its public stand on the need for extensive consultation of affected interest groups, has not permitted the agricultural Consultative Committees to discuss the heart of the agricultural question, i.e., the common prices for each commodity. The Council does not permit direct contacts with any interest groups whatsoever.⁶² The Management Committees set up by the Council in cooperation with the Commission do not contain any interest group representation, nor does the Committee of Permanent Representatives.⁶³ Thus, in spite of much Community rhetoric, interest group representation (whether Eurogroup or national interest group) is not institutionalized where the most important matters are discussed. We look in vain in the EC structure for anything approaching the British pattern of decision making in agriculture, in which the Minister of Agriculture is required by law to consult farm representatives on the rate for subsidies, product by product, in the Price Review.⁶⁴

This concludes the survey of variables which affect the development of a *clientela* relationship from the administrative side. Three of the variables examined seem to favor a *clientela* relationship between EC administrative agencies and Eurogroups: The agencies in the EC case are in general defined functionally and vertically. Agency regulatory activity is modal, requiring cooperation as well as data from those groups being regulated. And the EC agencies do not have full control over information. For these reasons, we would expect to see the growth of *clientela*.

On the other hand, two variables operate to discourage *clientela*. In the EC, the administrative agency is rarely envisioned by itself or by the clientele group to have the sole supreme aim of furthering the group's interests. And the agency-group relationship is rarely reciprocal. In those sectors for which the EC attempts to design and implement interventionist policies, such as transport and agriculture, the agency and the interest group do not share the same receptiveness toward negotiation. In the former case, the EC agency was willing but the transport organizations were not; in the latter case, the agricultural Eurogroups wanted more consultation than did the Commission or the Council. In the face of these impediments, the development of *clientela* seems difficult. If EC leaders and national leaders wanted to facilitate *clientela*, one major step forward would be the institutionalization of Eurogroup access to the relevant Directorates-General on major policy questions and the institutionalization of national interest group access to the working groups of the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Council itself. If consulta-

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 84–5.

⁶³ Jean A. Salmon, "Le Role des representations permanentes," in Gerbet and Pepy, *La decision dans les Communautés européennes* pp. 57–74. Feld says that national interest groups seek to influence the Committee of Permanent Representatives, but he does not describe or assess their efforts; Feld, p. 404.

⁶⁴ Roland Pennock, "Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America," in Richard Rose, ed. *Policy Making in Britain* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 211.

tion on the most important questions remains diffuse, ad hoc, and personalized, *clientela* will not characterize agency-group relations in the EC.

Would EC and national governmental leaders desire *clientela* at the Community level? EC leaders may not wish to see *clientela* become entrenched because it would limit their freedom of maneuver, especially in those areas such as agriculture which demand policy measures bound to alienate a significant part of the clientele group. In this case, *clientela* might be a formula for stalemate. Yet, EC leaders might still favor *clientela* because of the direct links to professional groups which it provides. And if the possibility of *parentela* ever did arise, EC bureaucrats would probably prefer *clientela* to *parentela*, since *clientela* does not pose as much of a threat to their administrative self-respect.

At the national level, government leaders obviously do not want strong links between economic sectors and EC institutions. Not only does this threaten to wipe out each national ministry's "turf" and its reason for existence; such strong vertical functionalism poses a threat to territoriality itself.

How do national interest groups view the possibility of *clientela* at the EC level? First of all, as we have mentioned, the EC would have to appear in the eyes of these groups as an organization which made important rules affecting their essential interests. Second, it is reasonable to suppose—and there is no research to which we can turn for evidence on this point—that in many cases national interest groups which already enjoy a satisfying relationship with a national ministry may look askance at a new Eurogroup, seeing in it a possible rival. For the national interest group may be undermined to the extent that the Eurogroup becomes the dominant articulator of the interests of the economic or professional sector concerned. On the other hand, if the national interest group thinks that it can further its goals by uniting with other groups in the same sector through a Eurogroup, thereby increasing the resources available for influencing policy making, it might support the development of Eurogroups.

The group variables involved in the development of *clientela* often represent the other half of the agency variables. In this discussion of group variables, we will concentrate on Eurogroups, since national interest groups are effectively blocked from public, direct access to EC institutions. If national interest groups want to make their views known during policy discussions, they must go through their minister for Council meetings and through their ministry's experts for the meetings of the CPR's working groups. A discussion of national groups' effectiveness in achieving this would, therefore, require a study of the agency-group relations of each member nation of the Community.

The interest group variables are as follows:

1. *Representativeness of the group*: In order to be of value to the regulating agency, the organized group must be representative of the clientele group. In the EC, representativeness varies. COPA and UNICE are fairly representative of agriculture and industry, respectively, in that they are composed of the major national federations in these fields. But certain "uncongenial" national organizations do not belong to these Eurogroups. For example, the Communist-led *Mouve-*

ment de Défense de l'Exploitation Familiale (MODEF) in France does not belong to COPA.

Representativeness becomes most problematical in those economic sectors beset by ideological, political, or religious cleavage. Labor and agriculture are the major clientele groups whose national interests have not formed a single Eurogroup. The Community organization of trade unions reflects the Socialist-Christian-Communist split which characterizes Continental labor. The Socialist group, formerly the CISC, is now the *Organisation Européenne de la Confédération Mondiale du Travail*. The Christian body, formerly CISL, is now the *Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Libres dans la Communauté*.⁶⁵ The Communist unions in the Community, in spite of their suspicion of the EC as a potentially powerful, broad capitalist union, have nevertheless found it necessary to set up an "observation center" in Brussels, the Action Committee.⁶⁶ However, labor groups of the same persuasion in certain industries have been spurred to cooperative efforts in order to deal effectively with multinational corporations. Thus, the European Committee of Christian Metal Workers has moved toward transnational bargaining with Philips.⁶⁷ Whether these kinds of incentives will affect the formation of a Eurogroup for labor remains to be seen.

2. *Respectability of the group*: Usually, administrative agencies do not wish to deal with interest groups which are "suspect" in the dominant political culture. Obviously, Communist-led organizations are at a disadvantage in dealing with EC institutions. But administrative agencies also disapprove of interest groups which break away from the agency after a period of cooperation.

A revolt by an interest group which has previously been cooperative from the agency's point of view in negotiating for the clientele group can be extremely embarrassing and disruptive. An example of this is the series of demonstrations from 1968 to 1971 by EC farmers, culminating in a huge rally and riot in Brussels, as a protest against frozen farm prices. Did this harm COPA's and the national interest groups' relations with the EC? Probably not. The Commissioners, for example, may have been more impressed by the depth of the farmers' grievances than by their disregard of "law and order." And if the prevailing political culture regards such periodic outbreaks as quasi-legitimate means of protest, these actions will not irreparably harm the interest groups' relationship with the government agency. It is interesting that, in the EC at least, "respectable" ideologies count more than "respectable" actions. In terms of the actual number of incidents and demonstrations aimed at EC policies, the Communist trade unions have been much less belligerent than the farmers, yet it is the former and not the latter who have experienced difficulties of access.

⁶⁵ Feld, *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries*, p. 94; Thomas Barry-Braunthal, "Multinational Labor: European Workers Unite," *European Community*, April 1973, p. 22.

⁶⁶ Feld, "National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC," p. 396.

⁶⁷ Feld, *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries*, p. 94.

3. *Functionality and authoritativeness of the group*: The interest group must be able to speak for its members and ensure their compliance with agreements negotiated with the agency. Otherwise the agency will not waste its time in bargaining with interest group leaders who cannot compel obedience on the part of their members. Again, Eurogroups vary in their functionality. Where the constituent national groups agree on the policy to be followed by the Eurogroup, then obedience is not in question. This is the case for the sugar producers' Eurogroup, the *Comite International des Betteraviers Européens* (CIBE). COPA, on the other hand, is usually unsuccessful in binding its member organizations to policies made at the Community level. A spectacular example of failure was the support given by the president of the German farm group, the DBV, to President de Gaulle during the 1965 Community crisis, while COPA was attempting to impress all EC and national leaders with peasant unity in support of the common agricultural policy.⁶⁸

Eurogroups can also be functional for EC institutions by providing accurate information dossiers, position papers, etc. The large Eurogroups have permanent secretariats with research staffs and thus can be valuable to the Community institutions in providing information.

4. *Proximity of the group*: This point is self-evident but crucial. Physical proximity to the headquarters of the institutions making the decisions is essential to the interest group. The major Eurogroups have therefore set up permanent offices in Brussels for this reason.

In reviewing the group variables conducive to *clientela* we see that the balance sheet is less favorable than is the case for the agency variables. Eurogroups experience difficulties with regard to representativeness, respectability, and functionality and authority. One underlying reason for problems with each of these items is the diversity which the new Eurogroups must accommodate in the Community arena. Two possible solutions exist: (1) construct Eurogroups for narrowly defined economic sectors which are in fundamental agreement on their objectives, such as the Community sugar growers, or (2) construct Eurogroups for ideologically defined sectors, such as the Christian metal workers. The problem with the first alternative is that the narrowly defined economic sector may be so insignificant, e.g., button manufacturers, that it may have little influence with the administrative agency, while a Eurogroup of clothing manufacturers might have more influence. A trade off operates here between homogeneity within the clientele group which is to be organized and the effectiveness with which it may demand a hearing from the agency. The second alternative would lead to a Community-style *verzuihlung* system of interest representation. Problems arise, if, for example, the Christian metal workers only comprise 30 percent of all Community metal workers. One then has to organize the other "pillars" and, in addition, set up some channels of communication at the elite levels so that all metal worker Eurogroups can decide on a common approach to negotiations with the EC institutions.

A final obstacle to *clientela*, peculiar to the EC system, must be discussed. To

⁶⁸ Friedrich, p. 112.

the extent that national interest groups already experience a satisfying, strong, well-established *clientela* relationship with their national ministry, it is highly doubtful that they will forsake it for a less organized relationship with a Eurogroup, unless there are great material rewards for doing so.⁶⁹ *In this respect, national clientela militates against Community clientela.* This was the cause of the German DBV's continuing opposition to COPA: the German leaders saw their carefully constructed system of farm protection being dismantled and replaced by an economically harmful Community system. Hence their unease in the Eurogroup.

IV Conclusion

The literature on national interest groups and their relations with administrative agencies can yield interesting propositions useful in analyzing the politics of the European Community. Far from being inapplicable because of the different levels of analysis, the question emerging from studies of national interest groups remind us that the EC, too, is a system of institutions with finite resources, subject to similar constraints, and faced with multiple and conflicting demands from the environment. The use of perspectives drawn from the literature on national interest groups may provide a healthy alternative to the method of viewing the Community as a "unique" group of institutions in which certain political processes—be they the "rise of the technocrat" or the "decline of ideology"—proceed to work their will regardless of the concrete configurations of social and economic forces.

Thus the reader may have noticed that the word "integration" does not occur once in the essay. This was hardly an oversight on the part of this writer. It seems that the EC can be analyzed as an ongoing political system, that the performance of its institutions can be scrutinized, that the linkages between its elites and the organized groups surrounding them can be investigated, without necessarily placing them in the increasingly dilapidated framework of "European integration."

We have argued that, because the EC makes important rules on technical matters which affect many economic groups, it is useful to analyze administrative agency-group relationships from the perspective of *clientela*. This approach provides a group of variables which may indicate whether or not a long-lasting, highly structured, position-oriented relationship may arise between agency and group.

Using the research on national interest groups and national government agencies, one may analyze similar questions in the EC arena. Specific propositions may be derived from this earlier research, e.g.:

1. The stronger the *clientela* relationship on the national level, the weaker the agency-group relationship of the EC level;
2. The stronger the *clientela* relationship on the national level, the more reluctant will be the interest group to accord a major role to the Eurogroup.

The supranational level on which the Eurogroup is dealing may seem remote

⁶⁹ Feld, "National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC," p. 401.

to group elites compared to the more familiar system centered in the national capital. And Eurogroups will experience much greater difficulty in compelling obedience of its members than national groups. Thus, the older national patterns of *clientela* may affect significantly, if not largely determine, the linkages between EC agency and national interest groups, as well as the linkages between Eurogroup and national interest groups.

It is also possible to extend this type of analysis beyond interest group-government agency relations to relations between EC agencies and national agencies. Although this essay has limited its discussion to organized social and economic groups, one might also apply the approach to *clientela* within and between the formal, governmental ministries.

What patterns have agency-group relations assumed in the EC? What patterns may arise in the future? It seems clear that *parentela* has been totally absent in the EC up to the present, and it will not appear very soon on the scene. No Community political parties have arisen which could supply the driving force of a *parentela* relationship. EC parties have not arisen because there is nothing for them to do: The European Parliament is a parliament in name only, it exercises no real control over the workings of the EC, its members are not popularly chosen by a European electorate. The major actors in the EC are technical, professional, and government elites without direct mass linkages in the EC context.

If *parentela* is absent, with little chance of arising in the near future, what are the chances of *clientela* at the EC level? Without restating the findings of part III, we may simply reemphasize the major forces at work which favor and which hinder *clientela* at the Community level. The absence of territorial representation and issue-oriented political movements, the predominance of bureaucratic structures in EC decision making, the need for cooperation and data—all of these factors favor the development of *clientela* in the EC.

On the other hand, the resistance of national interest groups which enjoy a profitable national *clientela* relationship, the opposition of national ministries to new channels which bypass them, the problems of representativeness of the new Eurogroups—these factors serve to impede the growth of Community-level *clientela*.

Thus, the very presence of national *clientela* relationships may impede the growth of Community *clientela*. This is an interesting consequence of the different institutional levels: Even though *clientela* may have the same *analytical* content on both levels, in *political* terms its success on one level may spell its failure on the other.

Finally, in order for *clientela* to grow in the EC, major new channels of access would have to be institutionalized so that the Eurogroups would have structured means of communication with EC decision makers.

Therefore, at the present time the EC system remains both a potential threat to established national systems of agency-group relationships and a weak alternative to them.