

A majority of anthropologists would like to see their discipline benefit the best interests of humanity as a whole. Although intended as scientific inquiry, much of the ethnographic literature elicits sympathetic understandings of the people portrayed. As Penny Van Esterik (1985) sees it, the collective works of anthropology have been part of a lowercase letter "a" advocacy.

Yet in her classification, uppercase or capital "A" advocacy is more active and involves formal and explicit actions of advocacy. One version is legal advocacy, in which anthropologists are commissioned or volunteer to support the case of clients through research or expert testimony in court. Clients may be seeking redress for damages related to lost livelihoods and traditional lands. There is a long history of land claims advocacy in the United States, where anthropologists provided research and court appearances before the Indian Claims Commission (Lurie 1955). In Canada anthropologists do research, testify, and appear before courts and government commissions on behalf of First Nations (tribal) governments. Another form of capital "A" advocacy involves participation in sustained lobbying activities that attempt to influence public opinion and changes in policy. The attempts of Barbara Johnston and her colleagues to guide the United Nations toward a charter of environmental human rights are an example of that. Advocacy is also a big part of Action Anthropology, where anthropologists directly and collaboratively contribute their research efforts to community groups (Schensul 1974).

In their review of advocacy, Stephen and Jean Schensul (1978: 122) point out that most scientific and professional practice has served the interests of the sociopolitically dominant groups. Anthropological advocates work to strengthen the representation of marginal groups and to help laypersons overcome barriers to more meaningful participation in society. Furthermore, an "underlying feature of these advocacy activities is oriented toward building innovation and change on the culture resources and felt needs that exist in the community" (Schensul and Schensul 1978: 55). So, advocacy ultimately covers much of the scope of contemporary applied anthropology, especially in its relationship to policy.

### "The Truth, yet Not Necessarily the Whole Truth"

An exploration of the relationship of the two fields is contained in *Anthropology and Advocacy*, edited by Robert Paine (1985). Although anthropologists have frequently spoken on

behalf of different people, he points out that there has been little professional training for that role. Advocacy largely deals in information and involves delivering messages—making the vague more explicit, interpreting what has not been properly understood, and providing new information.

Paine asks for a definition of advocational truth. He concludes that there are as many truths as there are audiences. Presumably, he means that facts and observations correspond to the position that the advocate supports and that they need to be tailored for particular groups of people. So Paine points out that the advocate normally “should speak the truth, yet not necessarily the whole truth.” In other words, advocates generally withhold information that does not support their clients’ causes.

Paine explores some ethical dilemmas that anthropological advocates need to address. What happens when an anthropologist is unable to accept the clients’ views of the facts or if the client group’s position is personally repugnant? Paine does not suggest solutions to these dilemmas, but we are challenged to think about what our own solutions might be. Often the answer is straightforward: one just does not participate. For most anthropologists, taking up a position or being employed by a government to oppose an indigenous group’s land claim position should be easy to turn down. (However, anthropologists have, in a very few cases, actually taken positions opposing Aboriginal land claims.) Most anthropologists would also refuse to support the cause of a major corporation that has used unethical advertising procedures that targeted impoverished and otherwise vulnerable consumers.

But other situations are not so straightforward. Let me provide a personal example. Six or seven years ago, I was approached by a lawyer to do research on behalf of six Alberta Indian bands. They were preparing a legal challenge to the Canadian government’s decision to re-enfranchise Native women who had lost official Indian status and treaty rights because they had married non-Natives. I turned down a lucrative offer to engage in advocacy research. The lawyer responded, “How could you, of all people, an anthropologist, not want to protect the rights of a people to determine who their own members are?”

He did have a point, but I replied that this challenge was unjust because, in most cases, the women had married non-Natives on the basis of their personal preference not because they rejected their own culture. If the women divorced, which often happened, they became single mothers living in poverty. They were denied benefits that they had previously been entitled to by virtue of their Indian status. Then, to add to the injustice, this disenfranchisement was passed on to their children, who did not benefit from the funding for health, welfare, and education that would have been theirs by virtue of band membership. In sharp contrast, Indian men who married non-Native women did not lose their status or rights. If they divorced, their non-Native wives did not lose the status and privileges that they had gained through the marriage. All of this seemed unfair to me, and, because I saw the new legislation as an appropriate redress of the former injustice, I did not want to work against it. To do so would be against the best interests of the women and children being denied services.

Another anthropologist took the case. He felt comfortable with the required position of advocacy; he saw another advocacy truth in this situation—the principle that social groupings such as Native or Indian reservations should have the right to determine who their own members are. Their notions of membership, based upon their own rationale, should be rooted not only in law but in traditional criteria. Furthermore, there were difficulties in complying

with the new law. With a fixed amount of financial resources, band governments would have to look after the needs of women and children who would be coming back to overcrowded reserves. The case entails the issues of sovereignty and self-determination because band and tribal organizations in Canada have been engaged in a prolonged struggle to gain First Nations' status within the Canadian constitution. Surely, one could argue that to deny them determination of their own membership would make a mockery of any notion of self-determination.

I once raised this case in my applied anthropology class. One student was an Indian woman married to a former chief, and she herself had served as a band councilor. She was adamantly opposed to my position and did not have much sympathy for those women who had lost their status. She saw them as people who had rejected their heritage. Another student in the class made a compromise suggestion that an anthropologist could be an effective revealer and arbitrator of the truth. She suggested that, when hired, anthropologists should not support a position but instead should use their objective or scientific abilities to reveal all of the facts to the judges. I replied that that solution would not work, that anthropologists would have to pick a position and consistently follow through on it. In addition, they would morally and legally be required to support the position of the band, because they were hired by the band in the first place. The Indian woman agreed with me on that point.

Beyond sticking to a position, the anthropologist should provide the very best possible evidence to support it throughout all stages of the advocacy. It would be highly counterproductive to raise and document the opposing point of view unless the anthropologist intended to refute that view by even better anthropological evidence.

Paine asks another question: How can we prevent our advocacy from encouraging a situation of dependency among members or even leaders of the client group? There is such a risk when the anthropologist becomes a principal spokesperson for very impoverished, culturally distinct but marginalized groups. Such people would be unfamiliar with sources of power and leverages of influence among the media, bureaucrats, and politicians. Consider isolated tribal groups in Amazonia under the threat of environmental degradation through development. The anthropologist/advocate may take an important direct role in articulating the message to appropriate audiences. She or he may do most of the behind-the-scenes-work, making the important introductions, drafting statements and speeches, making suggestions about the appropriate logistics for influencing the decision makers or the public. She or he may even organize fund-raising to maintain the cause. Sometimes the advocacy cause persists for many years without complete or satisfactory resolution—as many as twenty-five to thirty years could be required in some land disputes. In situations like this, the client group could conceivably depend upon the services of anthropologist/advocates for many years. Fortunately, such a situation is less likely these days, as members of groups insist on taking a public role in their own causes, and anthropologists and others act as auxiliary consultants.

There is another pitfall. How does the anthropologist/advocate discourage the overly optimistic view that the results will be successful or act to bolster crushed hopes? Advocates working on behalf of some isolated or marginal group may appear to have knowledge or connections, because of their origins, education, class, or ethnicity, that they may not actually possess. On the surface, the anthropologist, often a young, white person of middle-class background, might seem to have more "metropolitan" connections to sources of

power and influence than the group he or she is working for. The anthropologist's involvement may only be the very first step in a long process, one that perhaps will lead to failure. Anthropologist/advocates must be very careful and make this limitation clear to those for whom they advocate.

Advocates should be clear as to what and whom they are supporting. Any society or community is divided or factionalized at some level. Not everybody would agree to the advocacy position even if, on the surface, it seems to be a just cause. Anthropologist/advocates will have to learn to navigate through such complexities and conflict to make the crucial decision whether to become involved in the first place. Somewhat different problems arise when anthropologists advocate for people who do not form an actual group, but are, instead, a category that shares some attributes. Examples might include homeless people, children, rape victims, single fathers, and so forth. Even here, it is important for anthropologists not to speak out of turn and hastily appropriate the legitimate voice of those who are being unjustly treated.

In spite of these difficulties, Paine deems it important that more anthropologists feel the "call" to advocacy. Anthropology may actually need an advocacy arm in order to maintain itself in a rapidly changing world that may not have much need for its more academic skills. Paine suggests that we study major societal issues in order to have our findings and perspectives taken seriously. Clearly, anthropologists need to advocate much more effectively for their own worth as social commentators.

To sharpen our advocacy skills, Paine suggests a number of points that need attention. When we are engaged in advocacy, we should try to make the foundations of our methodologies and findings clear to the principal stakeholders, the public, and other researchers. This means demonstrating that our findings are based on respectable standards of truth, not just sentiment and wishful thinking, and that these encompass representativeness, sampling, validity, reliability, and effective ways of summarizing the views of other peoples. Anthropologists as advocates need to establish their credentials. According to Paine, anthropologists might have to develop some narrower foci to their expertise. Instead of looking at a single culture in all of its aspects, anthropologists might specialize in one problem area or one aspect of culture in all of its contexts. Specializations have not been uncommon in anthropology, with people choosing certain topics such as poverty, child well-being, gender disparities, risk assessment, and occupational safety and viewing these topics in cross-cultural contexts.

## The Case against Anthropological Advocacy

Some are very skeptical about anthropological advocacy. They doubt that the practitioners of a science devoted to describing and analyzing all of the behaviors and ideologies of humanity can choose one cause and advocate it to the exclusion of others. Anthropologists need to remain objective. They need to keep a distance, avoid partisanship, and try to tell all sides of issues. Insofar as they would engage in the application of anthropology, their duties would be to provide fair and comprehensive analyses of the issues. Ultimately, the key ingredients for policy would emerge from nonpartisan information.

A strong representation of the academic part of this position has been taken by Hastrup and Ellass (1990). They contend that anthropology and advocacy are incompatible, even though some anthropologists have a moral conviction to engage in advocacy. Obstacles for a legitimate anthropological advocacy are present because "anthropology seeks to comprehend the context of local interests, while advocacy implies the pursuit of one interest." To do advocacy, one must step outside the profession. These opponents of advocacy maintain that "no cause can be legitimized in anthropological terms."

To illustrate their views, Hastrup and Ellass refer to their own 1988 fieldwork among the Arhuacos of Colombia. A proposal was being developed for an intensive horticultural program that was intended as launching the revitalization of their traditional culture and, in turn, providing a more autonomous status for Arhuacos within Colombia. The authors were asked by one group in the community to help assist with the proposal. They declined for a number of reasons, some of which were personal. They suspected that they had been asked mainly because the Arhuacos wanted someone else to do the paperwork and to avoid the frustrations of dealing with the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs. They also pointed to conflicts within the region. In their view, the intruding nonindigenous *colonos* who might be displaced were exploited marginal peasants trying to survive in a competitive world, and advocacy on behalf of the Arhuacos would show favoritism. Furthermore, the indigenous people themselves were divided between modernists and traditionalists. Not all of the population supported the proposal, although the degree of internal opposition was unclear.

The authors felt that their participation would entail a patronizing role, reinforcing "postcolonial" and "romantic" stereotypes. Their attitude is summarized by their imaginary response to the Arhuacos.

When some of the Arhuacos asked us to plead their particular cause to government and funding agencies, they immediately had our sympathy as well as our professional interest. They still have it; but before we can go on we must talk with them about the complexity of the social reality. They are not unaware of the conflicting interests, of course, but it appears that in their relation to the outside world (including ourselves) they still want to present themselves as a united community and therefore tend to be silent on issues of local conflict. We cannot take this self-presentation at face value; it masks a divided truth. Ultimately, our uncovering this "truth" may enable the Arhuacos to speak more convincingly for themselves. (1990: 307)

Beyond the specifics of their own study, Hastrup and Ellass cite a literature that is critical of advocacy, arguing that advocacy discourse is overemotional, oversimplified, overdramatic, and not equivalent to "the sound anthropological principle of suspended judgment until the complex patterns have been uncovered" (1990: 306). They also suggest that "we should never forget that a commitment to improving the world is no substitute for understanding it" (1990: 306). Overall, the article asserts the superiority of pure academic research over applied work and most certainly of pure academic research over advocacy. For the most part, commentators also seem to be broadly supportive of the authors' positions. Per Mathiesen (1990: 208) refers to a statement allegedly made by Frederick Barth, the distinguished Norwegian anthropologist. Barth's completely unsupported but fine-sounding aphorism

states "that the significant difference between basic anthropological research and applied research is that basic research is the more applicable."

### Response to the Criticism: The Pro-Advocacy and Anthropology Case

Hastrup and Ellass have done anthropology a service by stating their case openly. Anthropology sometimes seems an undisciplined "discipline" because there are no clear-cut subject boundaries. Debate is essential if its practitioners (academic or otherwise) are to discover their own bearings and senses of social responsibility. Hastrup and Ellass have outlined a strong case against anthropological advocacy that warns us of pitfalls and difficulties that need attention. It also forces partisans of advocacy to make their case.

To begin with, we might ask who actually is in breach of responsibility, the imaginary anthropological advocates for the Arhuaco cause or those who declined participation. One thing that has always been notable about anthropology is that it cannot be a purely "ivory tower" subject; it operates with real people in real communities. Furthermore, those communities always contain internal contradictions and confrontations as well as conflicts with other sectors of society, including those that have power over them. Anthropologists cannot avoid these differences. At the same time, they cannot merely insert themselves into other people's communities and expect their hosts to be willing bit players in their research. They should not be objectified—like rocks or plants—for the purposes of natural historical inquiry. Also, such outside researchers are advancing their own careers and fulfilling the agendas of university-based scholarship according to the latest scientific, literary, and philosophical fashions that obsess anthropology at any given time. Anthropology, although possibly itself in the long run a valuable institution that promotes varieties of human adaptation, is like any other science in that the truths of the day are always tentative. Therefore, they are subject to revisions with later advances in theory or method. Accordingly, it seems somewhat counterproductive and even pretentious to value the academic agenda above that of the felt needs of the people involved. We should, with an appropriate blend of humility and confidence, apply our research skills to people's needs. There is no particular reason why people such as the Arhuacos have any obligation to engage in our scientific and academic ventures. The engagement in research compels some form of reciprocity.

Although Hastrup and Ellass declined the invitation to engage in advocacy, we do not know that they have had any previous experience in applied anthropology, policy analysis, or advocacy. In general, their knowledge of applied anthropology is superficial, merely a few references to Malinowski. How do we know that their possible engagement in advocacy would have been misguided? It might actually have done a lot of good. Participation may have led to the kind of benefits sought by the Arhuacos. By engaging themselves, the anthropologists might have shown the Arhuacos that the anthropologists can be trusted and are committed to their well-being. The Arhuacos might have then reciprocated and provided those social scientists with deeper and more complete information that would have benefited their more purely academic studies, thus enhancing the scientific dimensions of their academic anthropology. As it stands, we do not have any convincing empirical

evidence of damage that might have been done if the anthropological advocacy had been conducted.

Hastrup and Ellass contend that advocacy is hasty, oversimplified, and overdramatic, but there is nothing that compels advocacy to be that way. Advocacy can be dispassionate, empirical, substantiated, careful in the way that it is framed, and based on very substantial information and research. Moreover, much of what sometimes passes for academic anthropology often actually consists of advocacy. Countless times I have heard presentations at academic conferences or read articles or books that are essentially one-sided. They describe minorities, ethnic groups, and others as disadvantaged, exploited, or damaged by powerful elites, missionaries, and commercial interests. What is more, it is quite appropriate to describe power imbalances and generate information about the oppressed. Yet I have noticed that the majority of these academic works are most often still reserved for the safe and generally placid atmosphere of academic conferences rather than exposed to the comments of the media and public forums. Little of the valid data and field observation makes its way to a large audience or even into academic journals. Is this because we have repressive standards of peer refereeing that remove most advocacy components of any arguments? Or is it because anthropologists grow timid and remove the flavor of social criticism before submitting their works to peer review? Do they fear the thrust and parry of public debate?

Much that has passed for objective anthropology, in fact, is presented in overly careful abstractions that describe institutions (e.g., kinship, religious ceremonies) as if no people were present. Because they are abstractions, these writings do not give much evidence of real-life experiences of living people. As an example, early ethnographers, such as Robert Lowie (1935), provided us with careful descriptions of a reported way of life that disappeared a long time ago among the Crow. At the same time, Crow communities were suffering the devastation of disease and the breakup of their land holdings through the Dawes or Allotment Act. Although such ethnography is valuable, it still might have been far better if he and the other Boasians had described real conditions and advocated for the real needs of American Indians.

Certainly people who find themselves being researched are rarely content with academic studies of their communities. They want information that can improve their lives rather than furthering someone's career in the social sciences. So it could be argued that anthropologists should collect data that could ultimately serve advocacy purposes. Most of the time academic anthropology is not of much use to many people. Except for a few scholars who might be interested in the esoterica of such topics as the genres of comparative oral literatures, deconstructing gender, and the countless other things that academic anthropologists have chosen to investigate, there is a small audience for their writing. Most of the time, such information is arcane, obscure, and too poorly framed for any use in advocacy, let alone policy analysis. Although much of it may be excellent scholarship, these publications are largely gathering dust in libraries. There is absolutely no evidence that its collection was any more proficient or scientific than the information collected for applied and advocacy studies.

In sum, anthropology cannot avoid advocacy if it wishes to engage in contemporary practice. There is a great need for anthropological advocacy, and those whom we study are unlikely to tolerate our presence if we satisfy our academic curiosity without giving them something in exchange. Furthermore, applied anthropology must, at the minimum, frequently advocate its findings to influence policy (Ervin 1991).

## Research and Technical Writing: An Advocacy Role for Practicing Anthropologists

Anthropologists may work for minority-group organizations or tribal governments to negotiate property or resource disputes, promote sovereignty, develop social, health, or educational programming, and, above all, seek funding for programming from governments. They must make their cases through research and position papers. The up-front lobbying or public advocacy is usually done by elected authorities (presidents, chiefs, and councilors), but much of the background work for this type of advocacy is done by hired consultants and staff.

John Peterson, Jr. (1974), describes some attributes and conditions for a supporting advocacy role. Anthropologists do most of their work behind the scenes here, providing research and other technical support for existing causes or proposals. As an analogy, he compares trial lawyers and brief lawyers in Great Britain. Brief lawyers never go before the courts, but they frame and fill in the most proficient arguments and details for their clients. Similarly, advocate anthropologists provide their clients with a number of alternate approaches and the details to be used in arguments.

Advocate anthropologists present one side of a case, the side of their clients. Information is only for client purposes; no record is allowed to be kept. All work is completely confidential. In Peterson's case, he was asked by the tribal chairman of the Choctaw Tribe in Mississippi to prepare a certain document, given access to certain information and sources, and then expected to prepare a case behind closed doors. Drafts of the document were destroyed, and he was forbidden to use any of the information for other purposes, such as books or academic articles. In effect, he became a full-time technical writer for the tribe and supervised the writing of other technical reports to support the client's causes or proposals.

Peterson illustrates the differences between a full-time advocate and an academic anthropologist. The first is a different *orientation to the self*. Advocates must be comfortable in subordinate positions and satisfied to remain in the background. Advocates must not assume to know more than their clients and must not expect to get credit. Second, the *orientation to a reference group* must be different. The advocate does not work in the field of anthropology as a scientific discipline. His client is not in the least bit interested in the advancement of method, theory, and knowledge in anthropology. The consultant or technician serves the interests of the client group—that is, his reference group. Advanced anthropological theory, method, and knowledge should only be of interest in the sense that advocates are expected to draw upon those skills in the service of clients. As advocates, they have no obligation to anthropology. A potential conflict exists, because scientific ethics require open access to data. However, in this subordinate role, all data must be kept confidential, and the advocate must accept all terms dictated by the client.

A third difference can be found in *measures of success*. Only the standards of the clients are valid. In Peterson's work, measurement of his success was a tribal triumph, in which his efforts as an anthropologist were totally unrecognized. The role of spokesperson in such advocacy must be relinquished by anthropologists and other similar outsiders.

Compared to the academic anthropologists, the advocate has different *standards of performance*. Like measurements of success, standards should only be considered in terms of the priorities and goals of the client reference group. In academic anthropology, sets of standards are relevant to scholarly excellence and revolve around method, theory, sources of

data, quantities and qualities of data, validity, reliability, and writing style. In academia these standards are paramount and are validated by peer review and other techniques of quality control. A proposal is not accepted, a grant not given, or a paper or book not allowed to come into print until it has met the highest standards. But such delays or quality controls may not be feasible in settings of advocacy. It is a matter of doing the best possible with whatever resources a person has available.

As a corollary, there is generally a difference in *time orientations*. The researcher-advocate must get his or her work done within certain deadlines. A proposal, position paper, or a response to an offer is worthless if it is too late. Elegance and theoretical sophistication cannot be motivating factors in these settings. Instead, timeliness, clarity, and impact of argument, along with reasonable supporting statements, are far more important.

Other skills and aptitudes are useful for the anthropologist/advocate. Some of them may overlap with academic anthropology. Skills at *cross-cultural communication* do have some parallels with academic anthropology but with a slightly different flavor. Rarely, in these contexts, can advocates speak for themselves or from their own perspectives. They must speak from the point of view of the client group. This might be done when significant representatives of the client group are present as well as important decision makers representing agencies of the dominant society. Here, the advocate may be expected to make a presentation, often of a technical nature, that explains the point of view of his client group in terms relevant to the dominant group. This may be done to obtain funds and other resources. Presumably, advocate anthropologists often share certain characteristics of the members of the dominant society's policy-making institutions. They may come from similar ethnic and class backgrounds; therefore, the translations may be more effective. But such advocates must be careful that they remain true to their clients' original assumptions and goals and that they maintain their subordinate role in these temporary spokesperson roles.

Peterson suggests that *group maintenance skills* are valuable. While remaining in a subordinate position, advocates should lend their best efforts to integrating group action toward the goals at hand by maintaining communication among members of the task force or group and between the task force and its superiors (e.g., the chief and tribal council). If the task force is working with an outside body such as a governmental agency, the advocate should encourage communication links and harmony. Yet communication may break down; factionalism and personality disputes may come to the fore. Brokerage and communication are important. Rather than becoming too involved in the disputes under consideration, the anthropologist could provide some objective or detached insight to maintain the group and intergroup effort. Peterson gives such examples as advising members of the white bureaucracy that some of their behavior was objectionable to the Choctaw. It had been received as personally motivated and malicious rather than a product of culturally correct behavior in a white bureaucracy. Overall, anthropologists might have the insights to show how conflict was institutionally and culturally derived rather than fueled by personal animosities. This may lead to a cooling-off period and a return to useful intergroup cooperation.

Another set of skills that an advocate anthropologist brings is the capacity to *understand methods and techniques from a variety of subject disciplines*. In the scenarios Peterson examines, the anthropologist is usually a "jack of all trades," bringing together information relevant to the employer's advocacy positions. If anthropologists cannot always do that directly, then they should know what sorts of experts to consult. Experts might include

people with specialized fields of knowledge such as public health, agronomy, education, or engineering, depending on the issue. If the client organization does not have the money to bring in such outside expertise, advocate anthropologists should know how to effectively research supporting evidence themselves. Anthropology is preadapted for this generalized role because of its own multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary attributes.

Two other related skills are mentioned by Peterson. These are the *ability to analyze situations from the clients' problem reference* and the anthropologist's skills as a *nonreactive translator of ideas*. It should be presumed that the members of communities are familiar with their own needs and priorities. As employees, the anthropologists should represent this familiarity in reports. Similarly, as nonreactive translators of ideas, the anthropologists should be open to the ideas of local people. As an example, Peterson alludes to a proposal for a new tribal education program. It was concluded that a Choctaw-designed preschool program was needed to prepare the children for other types of schooling. Most of the details and rationales for such a program were drawn up after a series of meetings among the Choctaw. These meetings detailed their practices and views on the nature of early childhood learning and the role of elders and nature in education. The proposal made very heavy use of Choctaw testimonies and insights. Later Peterson augmented these local testimonies with comparative materials about enculturation from the general social science literature.

Finally, he points out that, to work as advocates, anthropologists should have *organizational abilities*. Drawing upon skills as researchers and writers will not be enough. Significant clerical and administrative services must be maintained in order to carry out an advocacy cause for any group. Bookkeeping must be done; wages have to be paid; and tasks have to be allocated to particular people or subgroups.

While Peterson locates these qualities specifically within the context of advocacy practice, it should be noted that they also describe the basic circumstances for any practicing anthropologist working within an agency or company.

### Case Study: Anthropology in Court

Traditional venues for advocacy have included the courts, and anthropologists have made some significant contributions there; for example, see Omar Stewart's (1983) frequent testimonies on behalf of the Native American Church (otherwise known as the Peyote Cult).

Another interesting case is Barbara Joans' (1984) expert testimony that defended six elderly Bannock and Shoshoni women. In 1978 these women were accused by the social services agency in Pocatello, Idaho, of withholding information that would have made them ineligible for Supplementary Security Income (SSI). They were charged with fraud and ordered to make repayments of about \$2,000 each. The women, with the assistance of the local legal aid office, contended that they could not afford the repayments and that they had been misinformed about the SSI regulations and did not know their responsibilities. The problem centered on small amounts of land from which they had been receiving small payments from white renters. The amounts, between \$1,000 and \$2,000, were received at the end of the year—in December—although the rental agreements began each January. When asked by Social Services about any incomes received, they had not reported these payments because they did not have them. Social Services claimed that they should have reported them

During the 1970s and into the 1980s a major consumer boycott and international protest was directed at the Nestlé Corporation, a large multinational food company. The corporation had been promoting the use of bottle-feeding and baby formulas in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia at a time when its market share was diminishing in North America and Europe, because mothers were shifting back to breast-feeding, which was seen to have many health and psychological advantages.

From the point of view of Nestlé's opponents, the use of manufactured bottles and baby formulas could not be seen as beneficial, or even neutral, in Third World contexts. In fact, an argument could be made that they were detrimental to health and, sometimes, even life-threatening. First, the formulas required mixing with water, and most mothers living in dilapidated circumstances in urban slums found getting clean water to be extremely difficult. Boiling was not always possible or convenient, especially when scarce fuels were expensive. So contaminated water might be used to clean bottles after use. Diseases could then be passed on to babies who had not yet built up immunities. Furthermore, the use of bottles and formulas could be perceived as somewhat technologically advanced, because they required literacy for effective use. This made it difficult for most Third World mothers, who were often illiterate and quite rushed in their daily chores. Infant mortality could be greatly increased through diarrhea, dehydration, and gastroenteritis. Moreover, because bottle-feeding mothers were not nursing, their chances of becoming pregnant were higher. Traditionally, women would not wean children until they were several years old. Bottle-feeding interfered with the birth-control cycle, therefore encouraging higher populations, contributing to poverty and overcrowding.

In addition, there are advantages to breast-feeding. Breast milk is a natural and replenishable resource. More important, impoverished families would not have to find the money to pay for it. Furthermore, mothers' milk is a healthy product; it passes on invaluable maternal immunities to young children who live in circumstances of dangerous and endemic microbial diseases. Nutritionally, it is sound, providing protein and calcium and other nutrients that are important for healthy growth. Mothers who breast-feed their young children are able to bypass infected water sources.

Yet Nestlé persisted in its promotion of formula-feeding in developing countries. The company was alleged to have used seductive advertising and promotional incentives to get local doctors and departments of health to support the widespread diffusion of its products. One of the more unfortunate dimensions of advertising through pamphlets and billboards was to associate this style of feeding with modernity and prosperity, thus inducing unsuspecting impoverished mothers to associate their families' betterment with the formula. During this period, international protests emerged; they began in 1977 and culminated, through the efforts of the World Health Organization and UNICEF, in a set of regulations ensuring the ethical promotion of such products. All countries signed the convention—except the United States, which supported deregulation in commerce. Yet during this time, there was also a buildup of a protest movement organized primarily by concerned Americans. The climax was a consumer boycott, which lasted until 1984 when Nestlé agreed to comply with the guidelines.

Engaged in the boycott and advocacy campaign against Nestlé were a range of parties and interests. Included were doctors, nurses, and research scientists with knowledge of the detrimental effects. This issue contained important political and economic implications;

many people were opposed to the overreaching approaches taken by the corporation and the U.S. government. This was also a woman's issue during the formative 1970s period for feminists. There were also more traditionally oriented women such as those in the LaLeche League, who emphasized "family values" but especially the importance of breast-feeding. After long and fierce resistance and in spite of sometimes very effective counteradvocacy, Nestlé bowed under the pressure of the negative publicity and agreed to the principles laid out in the United Nations agreement in 1984.

During this period, Penny Van Esterik, an anthropologist who did her dissertation fieldwork in Thailand, came to play an important role in the advocacy campaign through debates and providing arguments through research. She also provided highly perceptive analyses of the advocacy process and the anthropological roles in it (Van Esterik 1985, 1989). Advocacy, in its choice of an issue, is often highly charged and personal. In the preface to her book, Van Esterik describes how a local Thai doctor had recommended formulas during her own routine prenatal examination, and she noticed Nestlé promotional material in the waiting room. Given her knowledge of Thailand, families, poverty, and medical anthropology, she was quite familiar with the damaging effects of Nestlé's promotion of their products in the Third World. Upon her return to North America in the 1970s, she held a teaching job at a Midwestern university and became active in a group that discussed the issues and organized educational forums and the local boycotts. Three times—1979, 1980, and 1982—she participated in debates about the issue, the last time directly with officials from Nestlé. In the intervening years, she had become involved in a very large research project investigating the issue. She was in charge of a series of on-site ethnographic investigations in Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, and Kenya to research the circumstances regarding mothers and their small children in conditions of urban poverty.

During the first two debates she acted as an impassioned private citizen, aware of the antiformal research literature and with some significant firsthand knowledge providing "punch" from her fieldwork. In the final debate, she was acting more as an expert—a research scientist, who had collated large amounts of data on the subject and become well versed in the medical and statistical data collected in the large-scale multidisciplinary research project. In retrospect, she outlines some pitfalls in taking the role of the expert researcher in advocacy cases.

Because of her awareness of the general literature, she realized how the same statistics could sometimes be used for different positions and how any study can be attacked for some methodological weaknesses. In preparing for the last debate, in which she was presented as an expert researcher, she also felt that she was cluttered with too many facts and did not know which were the best studies to cite.

At the debate itself, she was confronted by a male-female pair who represented the corporation, well versed in public relations, displaying a friendly, smooth demeanor with significant knowledge about research on the topic. As she put it, they were able "to take a lot of my thunder away." In a postmortem on the debate, she judged her performance this way: "I lost the simplicity and force of the advocate's voice, and spoke with the equivocal quaver of the academic" (Van Esterik 1989: 67). When she cited studies, the Nestlé officials replied with such objections as "that particular study was not based on a random sample." During the debate, the Nestlé officials made sincere and confident claims that their corporation was already following the ethical guidelines established by the World Health Organization. Yet

Van Esterik knew that it was not. In the debate, she did not have direct evidence at hand to precisely disprove that claim, so they were able to get away with it. They made other bold claims in their well-polished debating style: that there had been no significant reduction in breast-feeding in such countries; that there was already high infant mortality in the affected countries (presumably, therefore, not linked directly to the promotion or use of bottles); that there was no proven link between feeding decisions of mothers and advertising procedures. In addition, using their own reasoned, polite, and moderate debating styles, the hired advocates for Nestlé announced that they were not going to deal with "strident" lobby groups, thus appealing to American expectations of fair play and moderation.

In criticism of her own performance, Van Esterik judges that it was poor compared to that of the well-prepared Nestlé representatives. Nevertheless, eventually the boycott strategy did prevail, and her role was important.

### Lessons from the Nestlé Boycott

The difficulties that Van Esterik confronted are informative because they form a series of warnings about the preparations needed for engagement in long-term advocacy. One of these is anticipation of *advocacy burnout*. A few dedicated and knowledgeable individuals cannot carry out all of the time-consuming activities needed to maintain advocacy campaigns. They have to build extensive networks and coalitions of volunteer supporters and allies. They also have to delegate many tasks to others. Corporations or governments that are the targets of advocacy protest movements are designed to perpetuate themselves over the long term. They may find the protests irritating and decry the negative publicity, but they are better able to muster financial and personnel resources for the long haul. Through efforts by paid experts in public relations, they can develop smooth, well-focused, and well-financed countercampaigns of advocacy. In contrast, citizen advocacy groups tend to be ephemeral. At some point, their cause will end; they may win, but there is a very good chance that they may lose or exhaust their resources. In that process, the morale of the principal advocates may be deflated: they may tire and lose the capacity to sustain the fight. It is essential to build up a solid awareness among the followers and to train other people to share in the important tasks.

The second set of observations centers around the style of *advocacy communication*. That form of discourse tends to be direct, emotional, and dramatic. It uses arresting slogans. Some slogans might include "Nestlé kills babies" or a reference to infant formula as the "Kool-Aid of Jonestown." These effectively and emotionally focus attention on the key issues at hand. Slogans remain in the minds of members of the intended audience, the potential supporters from the public, who, in turn, might bring pressure on policy makers or the offending corporation. Accordingly, such rhetoric must be managed very carefully. Still, effective and emotion-raising communication is essential at some level for getting committed support for the cause.

Normal academic discourse is ill equipped for this. As Van Esterik (1985: 72) points out, scholarly communication tends to be the opposite of advocacy discourse. It is "indirect, detached, turgid and convoluted. It cannot easily generate slogans that can catch the imagination, and academics tend to equivocate, saying things like 'on the other hand.'" Advocates cannot do that.

Nonetheless, scientific knowledge, as provided by anthropologists and others, is valuable for these battles. A series of expert testimonies can be provided, sometimes for court cases, sometimes as part of public relations campaigns through the media or as preparation for public debates.

Scientists or other specialists will have to face opposition as they support an advocacy cause through testimony. If they are expert witnesses in a court case or in a debate, invariably they will be accused by lawyers or debating opponents of being biased and nonobjective. They may face personal discomfort in dealing with intense situations of cross-examination, media scrutiny, or debate. Worse yet, they may inadvertently make statements that might be used against them in the battle for public opinion. They might show evidence of emotional bias or uncertainty in their own position. Anthropologists and others voluntarily involved in advocacy are not usually trained for this sort of engagement, and advocacy groups do not have the mechanisms to provide such training. So anthropological and other scientifically based advocates may come across as very awkward and ineffective in such situations.

Van Esterik (1985) makes a valuable suggestion for such dilemmas of communication. Introducing the "native" perspective into the advocacy returns some of the needed emotionality and passion to the debate and provides authenticity for the advocate's case. Often that native experience has been buried within the debate. In the case of the breast-or-bottle controversy, the native perspective is that of Third World mothers who have to make some very difficult decisions regarding health and their children. Another example could be Indian elders who would argue passionately in a land-case hearing to redress past injustices to an indigenous people. Anthropologists can collect the testimonies of the people who cannot come to a debate at a cosmopolitan setting or facilitate bringing people with authentic voices to the public hearings.

A final concern that Van Esterik raises is that of *commitment*. This type of advocacy, though, requires no specific form of action; it is relatively passive. Capital "A" or active advocacy requires action and commitment by the advocate anthropologist, researching a group's case or position, testifying in court, or participating in large-scale public, media-directed protest campaigns on behalf of a cause.

To more academically inclined anthropologists, who do not participate in advocacy, it often seems capricious and based on sentiment or emotion. Advocacy is seen as something to be avoided, because it is unseemly and does not, in their view, reflect well on the discipline. Van Esterik (1985), responds that there are frequently very compelling reasons, on the face of the societal evidence, to participate in advocacy causes. The breast-or-bottle controversy that she dealt with had very much at stake—morbidity, mortality, factors of local empowerment, dimensions of social change, mother-child relations, continuing capacities to adapt, and the relationships of power among nation-states and large corporations. But any crystallization of commitment to big "A" (cause-related) advocacy is very difficult for many anthropologists, who might otherwise hear the "call."

It could be perilous for young academics just starting on a career to commit themselves to advocacy. They might have difficulty getting hired because of their opinions. They would have to devote a lot of their time to writing academic papers and books to ensure job security through tenure, promotion, and so forth. I might add that there might be serious obstacles for certain types of practicing anthropologists to becoming involved in capital "A" advocacy as well. Take the example of the public service—there are usually very explicit

rules denying the civil servant the right to engage in political or advocacy activities. So the possibilities for advocacy are structurally limited for many young anthropologists, who, psychologically and physically, might actually be at their peak for advocacy. As they become more secure, they lose the "fire in their belly" or the intensive emotional involvement.

For a long time yet, capital "A" advocacy will probably be an activity for only a minority in the discipline. For those who will be so engaged, Van Esterik recommends learning certain skills. We need to broaden our communication styles—to be prepared to communicate differently for different audiences both through writing and speaking. Perhaps one effective way of doing this is to first write up the anthropological evidence according to the standards of academic anthropology and then translate it for the intended lay audience. As a strategic consideration, she also suggests that we not only need to gain an understanding of those being exploited and for whom we are engaged in advocacy, but we also need to know a lot more about the groups who are in power or who are benefiting from the undesirable circumstances. Also, she suggests that anthropologists working in advocacy become part of interdisciplinary teams and work for the long term with agencies that are focused on related causes. Advocacy anthropology (like many dimensions of applied anthropology) also needs shorter turnover periods in the production of information essential to the advocacy causes. She suggests that we seek other funding sources than the ones usually available for anthropology in order to maintain research components of advocacy. To develop longer-term commitment, it might also be a good idea to introduce advocacy issues much earlier into the anthropological curriculum—providing anthropological perspectives on issues like discrimination and underdevelopment. Sound scholarship should be associated with these issues at an earlier stage in the student's career. Over time, advocacy anthropology will become a more acceptable dimension of anthropological activity (Van Esterik 1985).

### **Case Study: Anthropology and Intensive Livestock Operations**

The industrialization of agriculture has long been a threat to rural North Americans. It undermines the family farm and community, erodes rural self-sufficiency and self-determination, and can negatively affect health and the environment. This issue has received significant applied anthropological attention, beginning notably with the work of Walter Goldschmidt's (1947) *As You Sow*. In the 1940s Goldschmidt worked for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics—a social impact assessment branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, since eliminated as a result of pressure by agribusiness. Goldschmidt compared two California communities. In one case there were many more independent farmers; he demonstrated that per-land-unit production was greater, that there were higher family incomes, and that there were more prospering businesses, churches, and service clubs. The other town was dominated by factories in the fields, supported by federal irrigation subsidies, ownership was in the hands of absentee corporate owners, labor was migratory, poor, and marginal to town life, and crime was higher.

Durrenberger and Thu (1996a) point out that Goldschmidt's findings have been consistently repeated. For rural peoples, the decline of community is reinforced by federal and

state agricultural policies that favor the goals and profit motives of major agribusiness corporations in the supposed interests of efficiency and the untested assumption that only industrialized agriculture can cheaply feed the world.

With the possible exception of organic farming, corporate-dominated, industrialized, and vertically integrated agriculture dominates. The most dramatic example is the emergence of intensive livestock operations (ILOs). This trend began and is virtually complete within the poultry industry. Hog production is going the same way. The impacts of this hog industry have been scrutinized by a number of anthropologists, most notably Kendall Thu and Paul Durrenburger. Their leadership is prominent within the research and advocacy network scrutinizing the issue, and highlighted by their book, *Pigs, Profits, and Communities* (Thu and Durrenburger 1998) and articles (Durrenburger and Thu 1998; 1996a; 1996b; Thu and Durrenburger 1994; Thu 2003).

ILOs consist of multibarn units of low, flat, concrete buildings, where pigs, often in the thousands, are typically tightly confined in individual pens, never seeing the light of the outdoors, and not being permitted the natural foraging, rooting, and mud-wallowing behaviors required for well-being. Genetically engineered for uniform growth and to meet slaughterhouse standards, the pigs are fed corn or barley, and their waste products are removed through grates and funneling to open-air storage lagoons lined with clay or concrete. Inside, mega-barns are heavily ventilated through a system of fans, because the odors and air particles are unbearable for factory workers.

Such industrialized farming presents a number of serious health and environmental challenges. For the pigs, health is at risk because of high densities, the stresses of extreme confinement, and the possibilities of swine epidemics. For this reason, along with growth hormones (for rapid maturing to market), they are fed large amounts of antibiotics. Various recycled biochemical additives and antibiotics can then make their way to human tissue through water sources or eating pork. This reinforces overexposure to antibiotics, allowing strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to emerge, thus threatening long-term human health. Workers in such hog barns are at risk for respiratory and skin diseases and must constantly wear protective gear. Occupational hazards are extremely high due to the stress of confined working conditions, noise levels, odors, and the frustrations of dealing with stressed and frightened hogs. There are a striking number of deaths annually due to accidents in these facilities (Donham 1998), sometimes caused by workers being overcome by fumes and falling into lagoons.

Beyond the barns, neighbors for many miles may complain of enormous stench that affect physical and mental health in significant chronic ways (Donham 1998; Schiffman et al. 1998). This also interferes with rural social life—family visits, sociable get-togethers—and lowers property values. Waste lagoons are at serious risk of overflowing during heavy rainstorms. In North Carolina, a number of rivers have been severely polluted, causing massive damage to fish and fisheries and to human health through outbreaks such as *pfisteria* infections, a flesh-destroying bacterium (Dove 2003). There are several major issues focused on environmental pollution through these ILOs. Hogs produce three times the amount of excrement as humans. This leads to significant risks of water pollution. In some states and provinces the number of pigs significantly exceeds the human population. Factory farming—be it poultry, cattle, or hogs—requires enormous amounts of water. So this places communities, especially in the drought-prone American and Canadian Wests, in jeopardy with

regard to water management when such enterprises are promoted by corporations as solutions to rural economic decline.

Social and socioeconomic impacts are significant. For many mixed family farms, raising hogs has traditionally been the way to maintain decent family incomes and to survive ever-rising farming costs. When corn, wheat, or barley prices are low, farmers could feed hogs from their own supplies of grain and sell them during favorable markets. Some specialized in raising piglets for several months and then sold them to other operations that specialized in raising them to market size. In some jurisdictions, such as in the Canadian Prairies, there were "single-desk" marketing boards that allowed farmers, no matter what their level of operation, to sell on an equal basis before pigs were sent to slaughterhouses. Now, as Tait (2003) points out, all single-desk marketing has been eliminated. Farmers must compete with big factory farm operations and sell directly to the hog slaughtering and processing companies, often the same transnationals that own the hog ILOs. The number of hog producers has been dramatically decreasing over the last several decades, and the proportion of pigs raised by ILOs of over 5,000 pigs rose by over 250% from 1993 to 1996 (Thu 2003).

Other social problems are associated with ILOs. When they are proposed for rural areas, they can create deep divisions within families and communities. For those opposed, they represent lost family farms plus environmental and health risks. Those favoring ILOs see them as economic development and as a source of badly needed jobs. These positions usually become hardened and do not disappear, no matter which side prevails. Beyond this, the promise of jobs may prove to create other problems. "Right to farm" laws often exempt corporate ILOs from unionization, and other fair labor standards, benefits, and safety regulations. Such legislation was originally intended to allow family farmers to easily employ family members, but they discriminate against ILO employees working under hazardous and stressful conditions at low wages. As a result, ILOs may find it difficult to recruit local labor and resort to bringing migratory labor from as far away as Latin America. This often leads to circumstances that discriminate against the latter and impose new challenges for the local communities in providing health and education, services to transients, and, for both sides, adjusting to potential ethnic conflict. (An equally compelling anthropological research and advocacy domain is found with research on the proliferation of slaughterhouses matching ILOs throughout the Mid- and Western United States. See Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995 and Grey 1996, 1999 for significant anthropological contributions.)

Returning to hog barns, Kendall Thu of Northern Illinois University has been the most active of the anthropologists in presenting this well-researched advocacy. In a personal communication, he highlights some of his activities and motives as a research and advocacy anthropologist.

In 1994, Paul Durrenberger and I wrote a seemingly innocuous editorial for the *Des Moines Register*, Iowa's largest newspaper. Based upon our rapid appraisal fieldwork in North Carolina, we warned Iowans of the pitfalls of allowing the state's prosperous family-farm based livestock sector to follow an industrial model of production. Soon thereafter, we were besieged by industry leaders and their minions attempting to muzzle us. In fact, industry leaders met with our University President in, what we could only view, as an attempt to shut us up. Our OpEd piece ended up being a kind of social science dye injected into an increasingly pathological system whose beneficiaries were outraged, while many suffering the consequences saw a voice for their cause.

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My applied work involves a strategy combining research with advocacy through the media, public speaking, legislative testimony, expert witness work in the courtroom, holding industries publicly accountable for co-opting science, work with non-profit organizations, and cooperation among community groups. This includes testimony before state legislatures, presentations at public hearings throughout the U.S. and Canada, consultancy to the EPA's Small Farm Advisory Committee, membership on former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman's Federal Agricultural Air Quality Task Force, work with numerous family farm and environmental stakeholder groups, *pro bono* work as a legal expert for community groups, as well as recent work with the international organization Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment.

Recently, I have been fortunate enough to have received ongoing support from the McKnight Foundation to pursue my applied efforts. This has allowed me to focus on providing technical assistance to a variety of stakeholder groups in Iowa and Illinois responding to environmental and public health issues resulting from the spread of industrial-scale livestock operations. Such support allows me to track and analyze proposed agricultural and environmental policy changes that may negatively affect rural communities. Part of this effort requires holding accountable those who defend irresponsible policies supporting industry malfeasance in the guise of "sound science." For example, major changes to the EPA's Clean Water Act were intended to provide better regulation of industrial scale livestock operations which are documented to pollute ground and surface water, create health problems from airborne emissions, and create social divisions throughout the rural U.S. An analysis of the proposed rules showed huge loopholes that, far from regulating the industry, provided legal coverage to pollute further exacerbating rural community problems. As a Board member of a non-profit organization called Illinois Stewardship Alliance, I helped assemble a coalition of like-minded farm and environmental groups who are currently using the analysis to lobby the state to close regulatory loopholes.

Many of the outcomes of my applied work are unclear. It is much easier to write a report, publish an article, or give a presentation than it is to mobilize the necessary scientific and organizational resources to usher in change. However, *research and advocacy are necessary partners. Science never has, nor ever will, exist in a political vacuum. If we do not advocate based on the rigor of our ethnographies, by default we have made a decision affecting the lives of those whose knowledge provided for our professional careers* [emphasis added].

## Advocacy for Individuals

There is one other way in which advocacy might enter the work of practicing anthropologists—in the day-to-day advocacy for the individual or family needs of clients. This advocacy is done in a manner similar to that of doctors, nurses, and social workers. Individuals may need counseling, direction, and referrals in trying to adjust to their life circumstances. Anthropologists in these contexts would speak, intercede, or write on behalf of their clients with officials from other agencies to meet specific needs. These advocacy needs could relate to income, specialized counseling, access to programs or instruction, health, finding sources of support and funding, and so forth. Although practicing anthropologists might more normally be seen as providing background research, evaluations, and program design that pertains to whole groups or categories of people, they also may call for attention to the best interests of individual clients. For instance, four of my department's former graduate

students have held jobs at service agencies that help newly arrived government-sponsored immigrants (refugees) from many different countries. Their jobs have included administration, program design, and instruction. In all of these cases, while going through a lot of on-the-job training, their anthropological background has served them well, not the least of their assets being their cross-cultural sensitivities. Their jobs have called for direct counseling, and that requires seeing their clients in their contexts of culture, family, and community. This vision has helped them counsel clients at court appearances; consult with social workers; solve conflicts with neighbors, landlords, and bosses; consider health problems; and deal with problems or misunderstandings that may have arisen in school. This capacity to deal with the "hands-on" needs of individual clients and families is a skill worthy of cultivation in practicing anthropologists.

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## Summary

As we have seen, advocacy within anthropology can be a perilous and sometimes messy activity, yet it is essential for the viability of an applied and practicing anthropology and perhaps for the survival of anthropology as a whole. Although advocacy is not something new to anthropology, there may be greater urgency for it now because, with rapid social change and globalization, more and more vulnerable peoples are imperiled by development, profit-seeking, and the downsizing of government services. Concurrently, there is more societal awareness of past injustices that contribute to current harm, and these recognitions have generated social movements. Since the 1960s, these movements have persisted in their pressures for attention to environmentalism, human rights, and other issues. Related to these circumstances is the power of the media to define an issue and to see its course through to the end. That can be a mixed blessing; the media can intensify adversarial relations and high drama, and it can also ignore very worthy ones, thus trivializing them.

For all of these reasons, many anthropologists strongly feel the pull of conscience and social responsibility to engage in advocacy because they have information that is crucial to the debates. Ethnography and other anthropological perspectives can arm anthropologists with the strategic knowledge that can inform many advocacy causes.

Anthropologists are finding new niches to serve new needs. Tribal or First Nations governments, immigrant associations, urban consumer groups, environmentalists, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities and other special interests have increased activities into such domains as law, conflict resolution, economic development, social services, health, and education. In the swirl of societal conflict and competition for resources, clients need assistance to confront the courts, bureaucracies, Congress, and state and provincial legislatures. Anthropologists can often be valuable in preparing the briefs that support their agendas.

There are other types of advocacy, including advocacy for applied anthropology itself. There is the ever-present need to publicize one's findings. One may be commissioned to prepare a report on a set of social needs or to evaluate a set of programs. Practicing anthropologists need to advocate effectively for the recognition of their findings and recommendations—such data frequently do not simply speak for themselves.

So anthropological advocacy contains a whole series of potential activities. All of them require convincing other people of the merits of a set of ideas through communication,

argument, counterargument, persuasion, and the effective and convincing presentations of points of view, based on data, interpretation, and sometimes theory. Just because it is messy and many academic anthropologists do not like it does not mean that applied and practicing anthropologists should shun it. In its many varieties, advocacy is central to practice and application.

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